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Preface 
May 2008, it was my first journey outside my home country Eritrea to Khartoum, 
Sudan. I lived in Sudan for 3 and half years as a refugee before I came to Norway. 
After staying 3 months in Khartoum as a refugee, I had the opportunity to work in 
Khartoum as a teacher. Sudan is the largest country in Africa and because of its 
natural resources the country was given the name “Mother of Africa”. Indeed the 
people of Sudan have been kind, helpful and hospitable to the Eritreans’ refugees 
who lived in Sudan for a long time. But it was my daily question why this country 
had suffered of civil war, starvation and corruption while the country is endowed 
with natural wealth.   
I was in Sudan when the long and bloody civil war between North and South Sudan 
came to an end after the referendum in 2011, in which the South Sudan became the 
newest African state in the world. However, still a lot of questions remained 
unresolved between the two nations, consequently, there were continuous 
confrontation over the ownership of the oil resource over the Abyei region. 
Therefore, it was my personal interest to study and write at an academic research on 
the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972. And I believe that the current problem 
between the North and South Sudan was the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement. Moreover, the people of South Sudan and Eritrea had a similar political 
development under the colonial rule during the 1970s, in which both countries were 
given a self autonomous status while majority of their population were in favour of 
independence.  
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Executive Summary 
In 1972, representatives of the Northern Sudan and the Southern Sudan reached a 
historic agreement to end the first bloody civil war in Sudan by way of negotiations, 
in which the third party mediator (Ethiopia) had participated in the peace process. 
However, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement had faced serious challenges for its 
implementation and as a result in 1983 it failed to bring sustainable peace between 
the two peoples. This thesis attempts to answer the research question: why the Addis 
Ababa Peace Agreement did fail? It thoroughly goes through the dominant conflict 
resolution theories and it uses a contemporary theory based on power-sharing and 
negotiation theory. The thesis will partly highlight the root causes of the war as the 
main cause for the beginning of the first civil war in Sudan. The thesis concludes 
with the final failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement by stating all the 
important factors: the social, economic, security and political dimensions.   
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 Organization of the Thesis 
This research thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is an 
introduction and provides a general introduction, presents the research design, 
methodology and the methodology underpinning the collection of sources and 
limitation of the research. Chapter two discusses the root causes of the civil war 
between North and South Sudan, a brief presentation of the first civil war from 1955 
to 1972 and the military and political shifts prior to the formation of Anya Nya 
movement. 
The chapter three provides a theoretical analysis to research paper. Under this topic I 
will discuss the theory of power-sharing and negotiation in light of the Addis Ababa 
Peace Agreement. Chapter four discusses the historical development of the Round 
Table Conference, the genesis of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the legal terms 
of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreements and the politics of Southern Sudan during the peace agreement. Chapter 
five will advance my hypothesis as to why the AAPA was a failure and reasons why 
the new civil war started in 1983. Finally, the research thesis gives the conclusion 
part. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
As the largest country in Africa, Sudan is characterized by geographical diversity, 
which is reflected in its multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual populations. By 
the end of the 20
th
 century, the country was failing to deal with complex religious 
and political tensions that threatened its territorial integrity. Despite the Round 
Table Conference (RTC), 1965 and Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA), 1972 
which had attempted to address the first civil war between the North and South 
Sudan, security and stability did not achieve over the entire part of Sudan until the 
last Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005.
1
 
Two causes are traditionally put forward to explain the first civil war in Sudan. One 
is the division between the North and South based on centuries of exploitation and 
slavery campaign by the “Arab-North” against the “African-South” and the other is 
the British imperialist policy who split Sudan into “African” and “Arab” since there 
were no natural or historical divisions between the two regions.
2
 
The Rule of Turko-Egyptian 
The political change by the end of 18
th
 century was considered as a turning point in 
the history of South, in which part of the Southern Sudan became a strategic 
territory for the expansion of the Turkish invasion. This period also witnessed 
massive Southward migrations from the North and a gradual extension of 
agricultural and sedimentary way of life. European travelers and missionaries were 
coming to the South in search of cultivable land and to spread Christianity in the 
region. These massive foreign movements toward Southern Sudan changed the 
traditional way of life. Conflict over grazing rights erupted between the indigenous 
                                                 
1Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmad, "Sudan Peace Agreements: Current Challenges and Future Prospects," 
Working Paper - Chr. Michelsen Institute, no. 1 (2010): 7. 
2 Douglas H. Johnson and Institute The International African, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, African 
Issues (Kampala: The International African Institute James Currey, 2011), 1. 
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inhabitants and the new comers. The European travelers were not only spreading 
Christianity but also diseases among the populations.
3
 
In 1805 after Muhammad Ali became governor of Egypt, he wanted to expand 
Ottoman/Egyptian influence along the Mediterranean and southwards towards 
Sudan. As part of his grand strategy, he conquered part of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan 
and the Red Sea coast were becoming under the influence of Muhammad Ali. The 
well equipped and organized Egyptian armies defeated the long-established Funj 
kingdom in the region.
4
 One of Ali’s political motives for invading the Southern 
Sudan was to obtain slaves for his army and use them as cheap labor force. Upon 
completing the conquest of Sudan, the government of Egypt in collaboration with 
the Northern people of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan and the Red Sea engaged in slave 
raids against the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk of the Southern Sudan. Furthermore, the 
imposition of heavy taxes by the Turko-Egyptian regime up-on the Northern Sudan 
also meant that the people in the North needed more income to pay their taxes and 
therefore, the slave-raids were intensified among the Southern people.
5
  
This situation in South Sudan created a political, social and economic division/gap 
between the North and the South. From the period of 1821-1879, the successive 
Turko-Egyptian governments brought an end to the kingdom of the Funji and 
created a centralized government in Sudan. As a result Northern Sudan was divided 
into 6 provinces with its own capital cities, boundaries and local councils. However, 
the Egyptian rulers were not able to create a centralized government in Southern 
Sudan due to local resistance from tribal leaders and prevalence of tropical diseases. 
As a result, Turko-Egyptian rule only achieved a weak integration of North and 
South Sudan.
6
  
 
 
                                                 
3 Anders Breidlid, Avelino Androga Said, and Astrid Kristine Breidlid, A Concise History of South Sudan, New 
Edition ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2014), 90-91. 
4Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10-12. 
5 Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, A Concise History of South Sudan, 98-99. 
6 Ibid. 
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The Rise of Mahdi 
The high taxes and continued slave raiding by the Turko-Egyptian government led 
to the rise of the Mahdi in the 1880’s. Muhammed Ahmed (the Mahdi) proclaimed 
himself as the redeemer of the Islamic faith and he promised to get rid of the Turks, 
Egyptian and the British out of Sudan. In 1881, the Mahdi followers (the Ansar) led 
a military campaign to unify the tribes of western, central Sudan and Southern 
Sudan. During this time the Dinka tribes supported him so that the oppression of the 
Turko-Egyptian rule came to an end. His disciples took the name “Ansars” which 
continue to be used even today by the Umma Party in Sudan. The rebel movement 
successfully controlled areas in Kordofan, Darfur, Bahr-el-Ghazal and by 1885 
Khartoum itself fell under the mercy of the Mahdi which marked the end of the 
Turkiyya regime.
7
  
The rebellion movement did not stop with the fall of Khartoum, it extended up to 
Egypt and the coast of East Africa. Although Mahdi and his followers were 
successful in defeating the Egyptian and the British, most of the Southern part of 
Sudan did not surrender to the hand of Mahdist government. Generally speaking, 
the rule of Mahdi had achieved major changes in the Southern Sudan. Unlike in the 
previous, Sudan was now divided explicitly along the religious line with the 
“Ansar” Muslim, in the North and the non-Muslim, in the South. While Northern 
slavery and cattle raids in South stopped during this period, inter-ethnic conflicts 
among the Southern people resumed as it was under the Turko-Egyptian rule.
8
    
The Era of Condominium 
An Anglo-Egyptian condominium was formed after the defeat of the Mahdi 
rebellion in 1899. Over the next three decades, the colonial government strove to 
bring the South Under its control. During the first ten years, the need to maintain 
peace and control violence in the country dominated the government agenda. The 
growing relations between the North Sudan and Egypt and their interests over the 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Andrew S. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 21. 
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Southern Sudan, led the British government to secure the Southern area for an 
extended East African Empire. In order to stop the influence of North Sudan and 
Egypt over the South Sudan, they administered the South Sudan as a separate entity 
from the North Sudan.  
Furthermore, the British government allowed missionaries to travel to the region to 
spread Christianity and the missionaries were allowed to open schools, provide 
health services and education. The British policy “divide and rule” in the early 
1940s did not change the political, economic and social structure of the Southern 
people, still majority of the population lived in the rural area with little access to 
education.
9
 
Decolonization 
With the end of World War II in 1945, the British government changed its policy 
with regard the administration of South Sudan. The Condominium government 
established a transitional period in Sudan that paved the way for the independence 
of Sudan. One year later (1946) the Sudan Administration Conference (SAC) 
composed of representatives from the North Sudan and the Condominium 
government suggested the unification of South and North Sudan. Many South 
Sudanese rejected the idea of a union with the North in which they would be 
governed by the Northern parliament. Indeed, the South Sudanese nationalists 
wanted their own separate parliament. However, both the Northern nationalists and 
the Egyptian government rejected the British plan to give self-determination for 
Southern Sudan. For its part, the Egyptian government supported a united Sudan 
because of its vital interest in the Nile valleys.
10
  
The process of decolonization and the end of the Condominium government in 
1954-55 had increased the tension between the Northerners and Southerners. This 
period also determined the fate of Southern Sudan as whether the Southern Sudan 
remained part of Sudan or an independent state. In 1955 after a long discussion 
                                                 
9 Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, A Concise History of South Sudan. 
10 Ibid.   
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among Southerners’ elites, violence, strikes and protest were conducted in various 
major cities and towns to support the independence of Southern Sudan. However, 
the Northern government soon regained control over major cities and many 
Southerners who had participated in the riots were arrested.
11
              
Despite the resistance of the Southerners, both the United Kingdom and Egypt 
concluded a dual agreement to end the colonial administration in Sudan and 
facilitated the Sudanese ‘self-government’. With the consent of the British and 
Egyptian governments, Sudan achieved its independence on January 1, 1956, with a 
conditional constitution. Many nations had accepted the independence of Sudan; the 
US was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state of Sudan.
12
 
In the process of handling the Sudan's independence, most of the civil services and 
administrative staff were increasingly put in the hand of the Northern Sudanese – 
largely the Southern Sudanese had very little role in the government office. The 
failure of the British government to create favorable political conditions between 
the North and the South led the country in to continuous chaos and conflict. The 
Arab-led Khartoum government botched to establish an autonomous government in 
the South, which led to a mutiny by Southern troops in the Equatoria region. The 
separatist Southerners showed their protest and began a low-scale civil war 
intended for the launching of an independent Southern state.
13
 
The Post-Independence era 
The post independence period was marked by a weak parliamentary system 
controlled by the pro Egyptian National Unionist Party (NUP), later named the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Umma Party. The newly established 
government instituted an Islamic administration, closing Christian missionary 
schools and expelling foreign teachers from the South. Following the General 
Ibrahim Abboud’s overthrowing of the civilian government in November 1958, a 
                                                 
11 Øystein H. Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the 
Southern Sudan, 1955-2005" (Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, 2010), 3. 
12 John Pike, "Sudan-First Civil War," Global Security.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm. (Accessed: 20 December, 2014) 
13 Ibid. 
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number of Southern dissidents went into exile in neighboring countries, where they 
organized political and armed resistance against the Government of Sudan (GOS).  
William Deng, a Dinka exiled in the Congo was among the leading dissident 
figures. While in exile he founded a political movement, Sudan Africa National 
Union (SANU), which led to the formation of the Anya Nya movement.
14
 Between 
1960 and 1964 the Anya Nya launched attacks on major cities and towns in the 
Northern Sudan, although, they were much more poorly equipped (old rifles, bows, 
arrows and spears) than Sudanese armed forces. By this time, the Anya Nya forces 
began to attract and influence many supporters throughout the country. Historians 
argue that the political advancement of the Southern people in the 1960s pushed the 
GOS into a formal dialogue and peace talks with the Anya Nya movement.
15
  
The 1965 peace deal between the Khartoum government and the Anya Nya forces 
did not bring political settlement, but at least it showed two important 
developments. For the first time, the Southerners formally stated a demand for the 
independence of Southern Sudan or regional autonomy. In addition, the GOS for 
the first time convened a constitutional conference to which many Africa nations 
were invited to take part in the conference. This implied that the conflict in Sudan 
then perceived as a regional issue.
16
            
The impact of the first civil war was a turning point in the history of Sudan for two 
reasons. First, it led the Southern people to organize themselves to obtain self-
determination by force, secondly, because the 1965 agreement brought the Southern 
to realize that a durable peace could not be achieved through a military alone. 
Despite of this, there was an early attempt to solve the conflict in Sudan by means 
of political dialogue, the civil war did not stop and it affected the social, economic 
and political conditions of Sudan in general, more particularly the South Sudan. 
                                                 
14 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace, International Peace Academy 
Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 81. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Raphael Koba Badal, Politcal Cleaveages within Southern Sudan: An Empirical Analysis of the Redivision 
Debate, in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt-Short Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan (Uppsala: Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, 1994), 107. 
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After the military government was overthrown by Nimeiri in 1971, the new GOS 
proposed a new agenda for the Southern Sudan and to restart the peace talks with 
Southern leaders. Nimeiri’s political incentive for peace negotiation was admired 
by many of the Southern politicians as the beginning of a new chapter in the history 
of Southern Sudan.
17
   
As Shinn (2004) describes the situation, the new GOS promised that his 
government would work for social justice for all Sudanese, including the Southern 
Sudan. It was in his interest for a long lasting peace and the right of regional 
autonomy for the Southern Sudan.
18
 Still according to Shinn the AAPA (1972) was 
Nimeiri’s most important success in his sixteen years of rule. Under the AAPA, the 
Southern people were granted regional autonomy which allowed them to form the 
Southern Regional Administration (SRA) and a national assembly in Juba.  
Both the GOS and the SRA agreed to form integrated or mixed national armed 
forces from both sides. The Southern regional government received a share of 
money from the central government and raise revenue from local taxation. 
Although the peace agreement was an important political development in Sudanese 
history, it did not address all the underlying issues. Following a bitter civil war, 
violations and mistrust between the two parties all the issues could not be entirely 
resolved by a single treaty.
19
  
Political divisions within the Southern Sudan, particularly between the leaders of 
Abel Alier, from the Dinka tribe and Joseph Lagu, from Equatoria made the region 
vulnerable and the Northern politicians could easily manipulate the political 
dilemma in the South. Furthermore, the lack of economic development and the rise 
of an Islamic party led by Hassan al Turabi in 1980 brought an end to the 10 years 
of peace between the North and South. In October 1981, the GOS dissolved the 
Regional Administration of the South, led by Alier and that indicated the abrogation 
                                                 
17Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern 
Sudan, 1955-2005," 5.  
18 David H. Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current 
Sudan Peace Process?," Annales d'Ethiopie 20, no. 1 (2004): 243. 
19 Ibid. 
8 
 
of the terms of the AAPA. After 2 years (1983), Nimeiri further announced the 
creation of the three new Southern Regional States with separate governments-the 
Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal which was against the protocol of the 
AAPA.
20
  
The failure of the AAPA led to Sudan’s second civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 
2005. The second civil war was much more destructive and violent than the first. It 
took the lives of many Southern people. With support of international and regional 
powers, both parties agreed to solve their differences based on a set of protocols 
and peace treaties, these treaties are collectively known as the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA). It was signed in January 9, 2005, between the GOS and 
the South People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).21  
This research paper, therefore, will focus on identifying and studying the factors 
contributing to the failure of the AAPA. In the process, we will assess the 
challenges that the AAPA was meant to address and how it collapsed and 
eventually ignited another civil war in the country. Moreover, the research will 
analyze the Power-sharing theory and negotiation theory in light of the Addis 
Ababa Peace Agreement. It is important to question why the government of 
Khartoum and Anya Nya forces did not commit themselves to the implementation 
of the AAPA. Therefore, it is the aim of this research paper to address such 
questions.  
1.1. The aim of the Research 
The focus of this research project is to discuss the conflict and the peace process 
between the North and South Sudan since the 1970s. It gives an overview of the 
background of the war, the process of negotiations and the impact of the peace 
process that changed the political structure of Sudan. The research project will only 
attempt to answer relevant questions with regard to the peace settlement of the 
1970s, more specifically to the period of 1972 and the paper will discuss what 
                                                 
20 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace, 88. 
21 Einas Ahmed, "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political 
Partnership in Sudan," Africa Spectrum 44, no. 3 (2009): 133. 
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factors contributed to the failure of the AAPA. Moreover, the research will address 
to what extent the political negotiations promoted relative peace for the Southern 
Sudan from 1972 up to 1983? Hopefully this paper will attempt to answer the 
research questions and would contribute to the academic knowledge to the history 
of Sudan. 
 
Keohane, Verba and King (1994) argue that in order for a research project to be 
relevant “it should meet the two criteria of posing a question that is important in the 
real world, and contribute to the already existing literature.”22 My research project 
fulfills both the criteria. The peace agreement between the North and South Soudan 
could be taken as the best example where Africa’s longest civil war came to an end 
in the early 1970s.  This proves that my research is important in the real world. And 
the other aspect is that this research project will contribute somehow for other 
scholars to use as a point of reference and would give them an inspiration for 
further research. 
 
1.2.  Research Question 
This research paper at hand will answer the following questions on the basis of a 
thorough literature review as well as empirical investigation in which the war, 
negotiations and peace between North and South Sudan. “What factors contributed 
to the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement?  And under the main topic of 
the research question, I will try to answer the following sub questions: 
- What were the legal aspects of the AAPA?  
- Did the Southern Political groups and the government of Khartoum attempt 
to implement the AAPA? 
- To what extent did the regional and international actors play a role in the 
implementation of the AAPA? 
 
                                                 
22 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 15. 
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1.3.  Sources and Methods of the Research 
In order to answer my research question, I will rely on a qualitative research design. 
A qualitative research method tends to “focus on one or a small number of cases, to 
use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in 
method and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some 
events or unit.”23 The data are collected mostly from books, reports, official 
documents and journals which were published in the early 1970s. These sources 
contain vital information with regard to the political situation of Sudan during the 
1970s.  
Conducting extensive interviews would serve as a primary source for the research, 
but that was difficult at this time because of the unstable political situation in Sudan 
and since my research topic is mainly concerned with 1970’s history of Sudan, 
some of the primary materials will be founded from the archival documents of the 
CMI-Michelsen Institute Bergen, Sudan Tribune online archive and the Sudan 
Open Archive (SOA). Plenty of information and historical accounts can be found 
from Human Right Watch, Chicago Tribune, African Journal of Political Science, 
Operation lifeline Sudan and news and reports that were posted at the time of the 
events. 
Textual analysis can be used to interpret the content and meaning of historical texts. 
Markula & Silk, assert that textual analysis is implemented as the focus on 
“interpreting the content and the meaning of already existing text.”24 Hence, the aim 
of the research is to find out what is being expressed in the text in relation to the 
civil war in Sudan by referring the various literature sources. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Pirkko Markula and Michael Silk, Qualitative Research for Physical Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 112. 
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1.4.  Limitation and Delimitation of the Research 
This research paper will discuss the issue of the first civil war and peace settlement 
between the GOS and Southern political groups. It starts by giving an overview of 
the root cause of the conflict, the period of AAPA (1972) and its failure. The 
research is paying attention to the AAPA of 1972 and it will not include every 
aspect of the second civil war in Sudan and the CPA of 2005.   
The other limitation of the research is that it doesn’t discuss the issue of Darfur and 
the war in the Eastern part of Sudan, although it is an important historical milestone 
in the history of Sudan.  Lack of primary sources in a form of an interview, one 
could say, is a weakness of this research. However, there are two major reasons 
behind it. First the political situation in Sudan is very sensitive at this time, 
informants are unable to give objective information and the second is due to lack of 
time and financial constraints that makes it impossible to travel abroad and visit 
some relevant places and concerned officials. 
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Chapter II: Background Information 
 2.1. The Root causes of the civil war 
This chapter highlights the background information of the first civil war in Sudan 
1955-72. What were the root causes of the civil war and how the civil war affected 
the political and military developments in the formation of the first political 
movement (Anya Nya I), that led up to the AAPA. The course of relationship 
between the North and South has often been explained by conflicts and wars. These 
conflicts and clashes could be associated with the legacy of the British colonial 
administration in the early 19
th
 century. During the Anglo-Egyptian rule, the North 
and South were administered as two political units. Mareng (2009) mentioned that 
“the British government policy was to make each province as self-contained and 
independent as possible.”25  
During the condominium period, the British policy toward South Sudan did not aim 
at unifying the region with the Northern Sudan but they wanted to unify the 
Southern Sudan and Uganda as part of British East Africa Empire. For this reason 
the British had setup separate administration institutions, school curricula and trade 
license in the Southern Sudan. Later on in 1948 that policy was changed and the 
British and Egyptian government agreed to secure their dual strategic interest on the 
Nile River by unifying the North and South Sudan under one administration. As a 
result, there was little autonomy given to the South in which the governors of the 
three provinces could not regularly attend the governors’ annual meeting in 
Khartoum. Indeed, before the independence of Sudan it was clear that all the civil 
and administrative staffs were in the hands of an Arab dominated ruling party in the 
North.  
Why were the British not committed to the autonomous status of the Southern 
Sudan? There are many ways one could answer this questions. In the first place, the 
Southern were not shown a unified interest to their identities due to lack of political, 
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educational and economic weakness during the early colonial period. And the 
Anglo-Egyptian government earnestly worked for the unification of Sudan due to 
their influences and strategic interests over the Nile valleys.
26
 
The other potential source of the conflicts was lack of understanding the nature of 
socio-ethnic relations between the North and South Sudan during the pre-colonial 
and colonial period. As Iyob & Gilbert stated in their book, “the making of 
contemporary Sudan and the Sudanese needs to be understood in terms other than a 
binary reduction of a perennial conflict between idealized caricatures of Arab or 
No-African/ and African or Non-Arab protagonists engaged in a zero-sum game of 
hegemony competition.”27 This political supremacy had been seen as an ongoing 
conflict between the two groups (the Arab and Non-Arab) for a long time. Neither 
the colonial government nor the general assembly of Sudan after the independence 
had ever tried to solve the above ethnic clashes between the North and South 
Sudan. It was this ideological and historical legacy of Arab domination over the 
South which was considered as an attack against their identity. Therefore, initially 
this had ignited the war between the North and South Sudan.
28
       
After the independence, Sudan was “characterized by the wealth of a few and the 
poverty of the majority”29 by which competition for resources was a major source 
of conflict between the North and South Sudan. The North had been given political, 
social and economic prosperity under the colonial rule, in addition to this they 
constructed modern transport systems, educational institutions and communication 
network and vital economic projects. Conversely, the Southerners were given a 
little opportunity for education, social service and economic development. As the 
wealth of the Sudan had never been equally distributed and shared to all the people 
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of Sudan, consequently, this has led to an armed conflict by the South against the 
North.
30
  
 2.2. The First civil war (1955-72) 
With this background information in mind, it is very important to discuss how the 
post independent era escalated the war in the Southern Sudan. Historians sometimes 
called this period of turmoil as the “Anya-Nya I guerrilla war.”31 In 1953, the first 
election for a self-governing Sudanese parliament was held. During the British 
decolonization, NUP was the largest party in the country and formed a government 
with Al-Azhari as the Prime Minister.
32
 The new government of Sudan adopted a 
new policy which was commonly known as “Sudanization” policy, which meant 
that all important administrative positions in the South would be held by 
Northerners.  
It must be remembered that before 1953 the British government promised to 
establish a federal government and educated Southern Sudan to have a good 
position after the independence of Sudan. As more Northern officials, merchants, 
business men and military personnel moved to the South to take the place of the 
departing British about 800 posts were given to the Northerners, while only eight 
went to Southerners. The failure of the British government to guarantee the right of 
the Southern people and give them an equal position in administration of the South 
resulted in mutiny.
33
 Even after the independence of Sudan, the process of 
Sudanization (New Sudan), and the formation of popular political parties that 
allowed the participation of all Sudanese people were underestimated and given 
little attention by the new GOS. The impact of these political imbalances among the 
Sudanese people were 
not only disappointing to the educated Southerners but it was also looked 
upon as the changing of one master for another and a new colonization by 
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the North. It was also looked upon as a breach of promise made by the 
Northerners, what the Southerners finally got much less than they were 
promised or made to believe that they would get.
34
 
Likewise, Joseph Lagu, the commander of the Southern rebel army during the first 
civil war gave the following report in his autobiography: 
We felt the Arab occupation indicated a possible renewal of the slave trade 
after the British left. The Southern Sudanese had always regarded the British 
as their deliverers and protectors, while they viewed the Northerners as slave 
traders and tormentors. The sudden departure of the British was a shock to 
most of us…. Fear and suspicion hovered over the South. It was not a true 
independence for the South, but the start of colonialism by the North, their 
traditional enemy.
35
  
Consequently, there were a number mutinies began in the Southern Equatoria 
region of Torit, Yambio and Nzara. On 18 August 1955, the first mutiny took place 
in Torit among the old colonial Equatorial corps. In the mutiny, there was an 
intense political activity among the educated Southerners and there were massive 
protests in the streets, involving many Southern people in the rally. The chaos 
intensified to the province of Equatoria where Northern officials and civilians were 
indiscriminately killed and shops looted. Moreover, Northern officials fled from the 
Wau and Malakal disorder and the British army was refused to intervene in the 
scene because the British government gave the political administration in the hand 
of the Northern Sudan in 1953 with the end of the condominium rule. The British 
officials, still nominally in charge of the Sudan’s affairs, helped the Sudanese army 
in restoring peace and order. However, the Northern government soon crashed the 
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uprising and hundreds of Southerners have been assumed involved in the uprising 
were killed and some 336 were known dead, 261 of whom were Northerners.
36
  
As Collins (2008) asserts, “when the first Northern troops cautiously entered Torit, 
it was complete the eerie silence hung in the air as a fateful omen for the beginning 
of a half-century of bloody, unrelenting civil war between Northern and Southern 
Sudanese in the valley of the upper Nile.”37 In a similar way the Sudan Tribune 
(2007) reported the following,  
the 18 August 1955 is not only national day, but it is also heroes day, it is a 
day when South Sudanese openly opened fire and told the government in 
Khartoum that enough is enough……., it is the day when other regions in 
South Sudan came together to give support to Torit mutineers and to shade 
their blood for the land God gave them without negotiations and argument.
38
  
Even though the uprising was crushed by the GOS, the sense of nationalism, 
identity and belongings among the Southern people would be a major motive for 
continuing their struggle for independence of Southern Sudan. On January 1, 1956, 
the British government announced the independence of Sudan and a state of Sudan 
was born-with unbalanced, ill-equipped, and unprepared government to run the 
country. The provisional constitution drafted by the British scholars left many 
issues unresolved –for example the issues of federalism and what would be the role 
of Islam in Southern region. Under this tense situation Sudan had conducted the 
parliamentary election and the new office appointed the Prime Minister Abdalla 
Khalil and the cabinet where most of the offices were dominated by the Umma 
party.
39
 
The new GOS led by Abdalla Khalil primarily concerned on enlarging the country’s 
agricultural sector and improving communication networks. However, as many 
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scholars viewed the socio-economic developments disrupted as the price of cotton 
was falling in 1957 and 1958. As a matter of this, there was no major development 
achieved neither in the North nor in the South during this time. And this period was 
also dominated by sectarian politics between the Sayid Abdel Rahman al Mahdi-the 
grandson of Mahdi and Sayyid Ali-Mirghani for succession of power in the 
parliament.  Following the two years of civilian government, the economic status of 
the Sudan was hit by severe recession and ineffective government structure led to a 
coup by Ibrahim Abboud, the commander in chief of the Sudanese Military in 
1958.Therefore, the first civil war between the North and South Sudan was a result 
of complex processes that I have mentioned in the above. 
2.3. The military and political developments prior to the formation of 
Anya-Nya movement 
After the mutiny of 1955, the situation in the Southern Sudan dramatically changed. 
In 1959 there was a shift in Southern administration by North, the broken promise 
of federalism for Sudan, and the deep-rooted cultural, religious and ethnic 
discrimination against Southern Sudanese by the North were some of the major 
significant changes.
40
 As Collins assessed the situation, “the harsh repression of the 
Southern Sudanese disturbances after the 1955 mutiny had stunned the Southerners 
into momentary passivity, a brooding bitter silence awaiting a spark to ignite the 
conflagration that became known as the Southern problem.”41 
Rolandsen claimed that after the army coup led by Abboud, the government did not 
bring significant changes to the majority of Southern Sudanese rather he intensified 
and continued the previous policies toward South Sudan.
42
 However, from an 
economic point of view, Natsios argued that the Abboud government brought 
temporary economic prosperity and relief to the people of Sudan and Southern 
Sudan. As part of his development, the government further strengthened foreign 
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relation with Western countries, USA-USAID and World Bank. As the USAID 
officer reported about South Sudan after his first visit (1989)  
I remember seeing in many Southern garrison cities the shells of bombed out 
buildings that had been constructed with multicolored square stone blocks, a 
distinctive trademark of general Abboud’s schools. In many areas, these 
blocks were the only evidence of development in the South and they were 
founded through foreign aid.
43
 
The Abboud leadership soon proclaimed a ten year plan of economic and social 
project, which developed three irrigation scheme plans in the eastern part of Sudan. 
These projects together took 75% of the total expenditures on agriculture. These 
economic policies again put more benefits to the regions that were already 
developed and gave less attention to the region of Southern Sudan. With regard to 
the cultural policy, Abboud’s major development in 1960s was the introduction of 
Islamization and Arabization. This meant that Arabic language was introduced as 
medium of instruction in the schools, conversion to Islam was highly encouraged 
and Christian missionaries were stopped or placed under firm restrictions by the 
government.
44
  
As many scholars such as Rolandsen asserts, the Abboud regime was successful in 
his economic policy toward the South but his regime believed that the only way to 
unify the country was by way of spreading Arabic institutions and Islamic faith to 
the South. And that policy brought him an opposition to his party, particularly from 
politicians and missionary groups in the Southern region and they opposed the 
government’s plan to introduce Islam and Arabic language in various schools.45 
In addition, the Abboud government authorized the Ministry of Education to take 
responsibility and promote the program of integration and Arabization of all South 
Sudan under one system. Thus Islamic institutions were opened, mosques were 
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constructed and the Sabbath was changed from Sunday to Friday. And the 
government firmly imposed Arabic language in Juba and Rumbek secondary 
schools from which the majority of the Southern educated elite had graduated. The 
majority of elites in Southern Sudan regarded the government’s policy as a 
continuation of Northern domination (Arab) over the minority of the indigenous 
Black Africa.
46
  
In 1960 the Missionary Societies Act (MSA), that regulated the various activities of 
the missionaries and forced students and teachers to strictly follow the application 
of Arabic language and virtually restricted the spread of Christianity among the 
Southern Sudan. The government further accused the missionaries “of endangering 
the integrity and unity of the country by encouraging the South to resist Arabization 
and Islamization.”47 Prominent figures from the South like Saturnion Lohure 
(Catholic priest), Joseph Oduho and Latuka school teachers educated at Bakhat al 
Ruda had shown their protest against the GOS. Because of their protest, they were 
forced in exile and there they founded the Sudan Christian Association (SCA) in 
1961 and they were joined by William Deng Nhial, a young Dinka administrator 
from the Bahr-el-Ghazal. In 1963 they formed a regional organization which they 
called the Sudan Africa National Union (SANU) in Kampala.
48
  
Here they sought support from some 60,000 refugees who lived in Uganda and 
Congo (the former name of Zaire) and published the voice of Southern Sudan in 
London but they showed lack of unity among themselves. SANU was gradually 
becoming the major driving force for the beginning of armed struggle against the 
GOS in 1964. Around 400 volunteers, mostly Latuka had formed the nucleus of a 
guerilla force at Agu Camp in eastern Equatoria under the nominal command of 
Lieutenant Emedio Tafeng Odongi.
49
 The cycle of violence became increasingly 
vicious as the government put more pressure on the civilians and the Southern 
educated left their towns and joined the guerrilla movement (the guerilla army was 
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named ‘Anya Nya’ meaning the poison of snakes). As a former Anya Nya fighter 
Akolo Giir Thiik described this time: 
It was like living under foreign occupation and we knew that somebody was 
constantly watching us…..These soldiers were behaving like criminals… and 
we had to leave for the bush to join the Anya Nya as that was the only way 
to escape the humiliation the Arab soldiers were bringing upon us.
50
 
When most of the civilians were arrested and tortured for their alleged role in the 
revolt, more and more people joined the rebellion in order to escape the suppression 
of the government. As I mentioned above, the exiled politicians eventually 
organized themselves and established SANU, which became one of the two 
Southern political parties leading to the autonomy government of the South.
51
  
Abboud’s policies did not only dismay the Southern people but also caused a major 
discontent among the most important Northern political parties. His government 
suspended and outlawed various political parties and was unable to reintegrate the 
Southern region as one part of Sudan. This resulted that his government was 
dangerous for the survival of the young nation as “a unitary state.”52 In addition to 
this, when the Abboud government intensified his Arabization and Islamization 
policies, the massive campaign caused slow progress in the economic development 
in Northern Sudan. It seemed the government was unable to stop the fight against 
the insurgents (Anya Nya), whereas the insurgents were overwhelming the 
government indirectly by draining funds toward the army and this caused lack of 
social services within the Northern fringes.  
As the repression was intense within the Southerners and the ambitious nature of 
the Abboud’s policies toward Islam created a huge threat not only to the 
Southerners but also to the neighboring countries of Congo and Ethiopia.
53
 As a 
result more and more Southern people had joined the rebellion forces against the 
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policy of the government toward Islam and the neighboring countries detested the 
Sudan’s Islamic regime. In order to weaken the government, they increased their 
supplies to the Anya Nya forces with guns, ammunition and made the Sudan’s 
conflict internationally known. 
Sudanese scholars criticized Abboud’s government as he was not well-educated and 
failed to be a qualified leader to articulate the ‘Islamist project’ and others felt that 
he had not brought a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Sudan. Although the 
Anya-Nya was not a dangerous threat to the Northern government during this time, 
its military activities were making the Southern problem very visible to the urban 
Northern Sudanese. It was this situation leading to the popular uprising among the 
Khartoum University students, teachers and other organizations.
54
 
The Southern armed struggle became an influential power among the Northern 
politicians, particularly in Khartoum. Consequently, in October 1964 the college 
students organized themselves into an uprising against the government of 
Khartoum, they demanding the resignation of the Abboud’s regime and the 
establishment of a civilian government in Sudan. After that the Abboud regime was 
forced to leave power and a civilian caretaker government led by Sir al-Khatim 
Khalifa came to power.
55
  Unlike the previous government, the new GOS believed 
that the ongoing conflict between the government of Khartoum and the Southern 
Sudan should be solved by means of negotiation and by acknowledging the issues 
in Southern Sudan. 
Under the new civilian government, different political parties were allowed to be 
organized and the Southern Sudanese parties came together to form a strong 
political party called the Southern Front. Clement Mbor- had been a prominent 
figure in the Juba Conference of 1947 and the leader of the Southern Front. He was 
chosen as a Minister of Interior in the ‘caretaker government’, for the first time in 
the history of Sudan a person from Southern Sudan came to power. Moreover, the 
government of Khalifa made a lot of efforts to end the war in the South. The other 
                                                 
54 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 80. 
55 Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, A Concise History of South Sudan, 215. 
22 
 
major development that had been taking place during this time was the beginning of 
political dialogues between the North-South Sudan. As a result of this, in 1965 the 
Round Table Conference (RTC) was convened to discuss and normalize the 
political relations between North and South Sudan.
56
  
Historically speaking the round table discussion was one of the most significant 
achievements of the Southern Sudan since the independence of Sudan. Because on 
the one hand it symbolized that the Northern politicians formally accepted that there 
was a need to consider the problem of the Southern people, what we call it “the 
Southern Problem”. That meant to give them an opportunity for political 
participation in the affair of Sudan and secondly, it showed us that the conflict in 
Sudan would never stop by means of war but through political dialogues and 
discussions. Therefore, chapter four will focus more on the formation of the RTC 
and the beginning of the political discussion as a means to solve the existing 
problem between the North and South. But in chapter three I will discuss some of 
the international relation theories that could explain and describe the nature of the 
conflict and peace agreement between the government of Khartoum and Southern 
Sudan. 
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Chapter III: Theory of the Research 
3.1. Prelude 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss what factors contributed to the failure of the 
AAPA and how that affected the relationship between the North and South. In order 
to make my research thesis competent and academically structured it is very 
important to discuss relevant theories that can explain and describe the nature of the 
civil war and the implementation of the peace process between the two parties (the 
GOS and Anya Nya movement). For our understanding, it is very important to 
explain first, what theory is all about? As Rourke (2007) defines, “theory is an idea 
or connected set of ideas about why things happen and how events and trends relate 
to one another.”57  
Rourke sees theory as a collection of ideas as to why and how events related to each 
other in the international arena. For instance using his theory it is possible to answer 
why the AAPA was a failure and how the various political developments within the 
country contributed to the failure of the agreement between the GOS and Southern 
Sudan leaders. However, Molloy (2004) explains “the purpose of theory is to bring 
order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain 
disconnected and unintelligible.”58 The statement is revealing that theory is a 
method of understanding international conflicts by using theoretical strategies but 
theory must be ‘consistent with the facts and with itself.’     
Therefore, using theory helps us to comprehend more clearly what has happened, 
predicts what may happen and gives us a better chance of evaluating the 
effectiveness of the theory. For this research study, I am going to use two theories: 
the Power-sharing theory and Negotiation theory. I will discuss the following 
theories below briefly. 
                                                 
57 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 11th ed. ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 18-
19. 
58 Sean Molloy, "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism," Diplomacy & Statecraft 
15, no. 1 (2004). 
24 
 
3.2. The Power-sharing Theory 
Power-sharing theory may be broadly defined “as any set of arrangements that 
prevents one political agency or collective from monopolizing power, whether 
temporarily or permanently.”59 Moreover, according to Abatan, Miti and others 
(2012) power-sharing means the involvement of all significant groups in political 
decision-making at the level of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the 
army. Therefore, the aim of power sharing is to reduce majority of one party or 
ethnic group that in danger the security of other ethnic group.
60
  Indeed many 
politicians have argued that power-sharing is becoming a useful tool to settle 
conflict and civil wars in Africa in the last two decades. The CPA of 2005, 
Liberia’s peace talks 2003, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC’s) of 2003 all 
contained elements of power-sharing. Power sharing arrangements bring various 
belligerents into joint governments and guarantee them an equal participation in the 
country’s politics.61 Moreover, Melani. C & Edmund. M (2012) claim that “this 
approach guarantees stability by giving all relevant groups a stake in the system.”62  
However, other scholars such as Abulemoi (2011), Weiner (1995) and Sowell 
(1990) point out that power-sharing sometimes fail to manage the post-civil war 
environment and can it itself pose a problem for conflict management.
63
 According 
to them Power-sharing theory would encourage weaker parties to engage in 
continuous conflict with the government in the aim of achieving power-sharing 
status in the future government. Critics of power-sharing say that “such 
arrangements are inflexible; that they promote ethnic division and that they are 
unlikely to promote stability in the long run.”64Therefore, they believe that the 
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theory of power sharing can only be applied if and only there is a stable ground for 
democratic system in the country.  
One of the positive aspects of power- sharing is that it encourages provision of 
political power, regional decentralization, military limitations between the warring 
parties and equal economic distribution of the state’s resource. So far this study has 
discussed and analyzed the various concepts of power sharing. The various power-
sharing relations between the GOS and the Southern people can be examined in the 
light of this theory. Let’s elaborate the theory of power-sharing in Sudan by taking 
some practical examples.  
Two years after the independence of Sudan, a parliamentary election was held in 
1958 to invite all the various political parties in the country to form the Sudan’s 
government. However, the distribution of political power in the parliament 
overwhelmed by the Umma Party and People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and very 
few members from Southern Liberal Party participated in the election. The 
Southern Party at the parliamentary meeting discussed the issue of religion, 
language and the status of Southern Sudan in the future Sudan. Although the 
Southern politicians struggled for their rights, the Umma Party took major power in 
Sudan after the general election.
65
  
The other example is that after the Abboud government was forced to hand over 
power in 1964 and a civilian government was formed, the RTC of 1965 was created 
to resolve the existing problems between the North and South Sudan. More than 
three parties participated and the prominent among them were Southern Sudan 
Africa Nationalist Union (SSANU) and Southern Sudan Front (SSF).  As part of the 
peace deal the government of Khartoum agreed to allow certain rights in the area of 
education, health and public works. However, RTC ended in deadlock, the Southern 
parties did not show a unified interest for the independence of Southern Sudan. Still 
RTC could be taken as an example of power-sharing to a lesser degree.
66
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The AAPA of 1972 can be taken as one of the best attempts of power sharing in the 
history of Sudan before the CPA of 2005. The Agreement had reached between the 
GOS and Southern Sudan, in that agreement for the first time the Southern Sudan 
got their autonomy status. The main agenda in the peace agreement was an equal 
distribution of national budget, economic development and equal share of political 
power in Sudan. As we can see it at the moment, the AAPA did bring a temporary 
peace settlement, by which the majority of the Southern people had participated in 
the administrative and legislative institutions of Sudan.  
In the period from 1972 to 1982, the agreement created a peace situation in Sudan 
between the North and South. The peace deal lasted until 1983 once the GOS 
declared Shar’a law to be the base of the Sudanese legal system. As I have 
discussed in the background information, one of the main causes for the beginning 
of the first civil war in Sudan was an unequal distribution of power and wealth 
between the North and South Sudan. Therefore, I believe that lack of implementing 
the theory of power-sharing was a key factor for the second civil war in Sudan. 
3.3. Negotiation theory  
Since its independence Sudan were struggling a lot to end the longest conflict in 
Africa between the North and South Sudan. In this section, I will discuss 
negotiation theory as a possible theory in explaining the conflict in Sudan. First, let 
me define the concept of negotiation. As Hopmann defines “negotiation is 
increasingly viewed as a tool in which conflicts may be resolved in such a way as to 
produce mutual benefits for the parties rather than exclusive benefits for one at the 
expense of others.”67  
However, Ikle` defines negotiation as “a process in which explicit proposals are put 
forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchanged or on 
the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.”68 
When negotiation takes place between two opposite parties, the main purpose of the 
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negotiation is that whether the negotiation results in an ‘agreement or stalemate’, 
whether the negotiation produces efficient mutual benefits between the two 
contender parties and is the negotiation may be evaluated in terms of distribution of 
benefits between the parties.  
One of the strongest criticisms to the process of negotiation is that if the two parties 
do not agree on the premise of the agreements, what will be the outcome of the 
negations. If there is no an abiding condition in the negotiation, the aim of that 
negotiation is in jeopardy. Therefore, my emphasis is that the role of commitment, 
warnings, threats, and promises in negotiations has to be monitored by external 
powers to ensure the sustainability of the negotiation. But the question is that, how 
the AAPA can be evaluated in light of the AAPA. 
The division of the North and South Sudan introduced by British colonial 
government, created differences of class, religion, linguistic and educational 
practices between the two groups. The British tried to isolate the Southern Sudan 
from the influence of the Northerners. As a result special administrative policies 
were put into effect, the so called the “Southern Policy”69 that provided for the use 
of English language and denying trade licenses with the Northerners. After the 
cancellation of the Southern policy by the British in 1946, the social and political 
divisions were creating fear and mistrust in the mind of  Southern Sudanese against 
the people in the North. These emotional and social boundaries between the two 
peoples created tensions and that continued to live after the period of 
independence.
70
 
In general terms, the discrepancy rates of modernization in the 1960s between the 
privileged people in North were relatively higher than the underprivileged people in 
the South. Accordingly, this unequal development of policies created by the 
Khartoum government built up tensions and political confrontations in the country. 
These situations were not only creating conflict in Sudan, but also allowed 
negotiation, mediation and compromise between North and South. How did the 
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Northern and Southern leaders able to reach a peaceful settlement in the Addis 
Ababa, 1972?  
The AAPA was the result of complex political negotiations between the GOS and 
South Sudan. But negotiations as a means to achieve peace was not an easy task, it 
required a lot of work and energy. First, both parties were under precarious 
conditions (conflicting interests) to accept the principle of negotiations. In this case 
we need to answer what factors forced the Khartoum government and the rebel 
group to accept negotiations as means to solve their conflicts/differences. These 
factors can be viewed as external and internal factors. Internal factor was the rise of 
a separatist group (the Anya Nya) from the Southern Sudan.  
These groups emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the GOS and eventually 
they demanded equal rights in Sudan’s political system or if not self determination. 
The war between the two fronts also meant the death of many Northern soldiers in 
the battle field. It was therefore challenging to the GOS to continue the war for such 
a long period. And the external factor was that the role of international and regional 
groups such as the Emperor of Ethiopia-a prominent figure in the AUO, Uganda, 
the British, and All Organization Church. They convinced the GOS to come to a 
table of negotiation for the stability and integrity of Sudan specifically and for the 
regional peace in the Horn of Africa in general.  
If the GOS failed to maintain the integrity of Sudan, the country would fall in the 
hand of extremist party such as the Muslim Brotherhood. They wanted to create an 
Islamic state inside and outside Sudan or Sudan would become one of the lost states 
in Africa, like Somalia. Thus two factors left the government of Khartoum with no 
choice, but to negotiate. Nonetheless, the Southern Sudan was also certainly 
affected by the long civil war. The war left them with a lot of casualties, cost 
thousands of lives, produced more and more refugees and internally displaced. 
Therefore, the South Sudan remained with no option but to mediate through the 
29 
 
regional and international communities as the best solution for them to end the 
war.
71
  
In addition, the impact of this peace settlement through negotiations produced an 
urgent situation for the bargaining parties- in which Nimeiri’s government balanced 
the army and bureaucrat staff between his forces and Southern forces. And both 
leaders determined to foster political dialogues as means to stop the conflict for 
mutual benefits. The impact of this negotiation process in the long run will be 
discussed in the next chapters.  
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Chapter IV: The Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement 
4.1.  The Round Table Conference, 1965 
This chapter will explore the peace agreement between the GOS and Southern 
Sudan. It includes the Round Table Conference (RTC) which happened prior to the 
formation of the AAPA. In 1965 unsuccessful dialogues had taken place in Sudan 
to end the first civil war between the North and South. This political dialogue was 
called the “Round Table Conference” (RTC). Although the RTC did not result in 
the formation of an independent state in Southern Sudan and to ease the conflict in 
Sudan, the political unity in the South became a major threat to the government of 
Khartoum to consider the “Question of Southern Sudan.”  
The 1964 “October Revolution” had created a favorable atmosphere for peace talks 
between the North and South Sudan. Yet scholars disagree about the cause of the 
revolution and its impact toward the RTC/peace talks. Collins (2008) claimed that 
although the Anya Nya movement was not a dangerous insurgency during the 1964, 
its military capabilities and intelligence made the Southern issue very noticeable 
among the Northern Sudanese politicians and academicians. As a result, many 
politicians, teachers and college students were criticizing and calling the GOS for 
not doing enough to crush the rebels or to create a peaceful dialogue with insurgent 
group.
72
  
Scholar Wakoson (1987) on the other hand, emphasizes that the Anya Nya 
movement was not at all a threat to the GOS in Khartoum during the 1960s, but 
Abboud’s political policy toward the people of Sudan. During his rule, he banned 
all political parties, the Umma, NUP and PDP alleged of conspiracy against his rule 
and in Southern Sudan, the government extended Arabic institutions among the 
Southern people particularly in the field of education and religion. This led to an 
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outraged demonstration from the Northern parties including government workers 
and university students. Also in a similar way the Southern rebels intensified their 
attack on government strategies and carried out major offensives. Eventually, all 
these events led to the collapse of the Abboud regime and the beginning of the 
October Revolution.
73
 
Unlike to the above arguments, McClintock (1970) and International Crisis Groups 
(2012) believe that both the military success of the Southern rebels and the 
dictatorial nature of Abboud regime led to a political crisis called the “October 
Revolution”.74 On October 22, 1964 the university students in Khartoum were 
demanding the resignation of the Abboud government and calling for a transitional 
government in Sudan. The initial stage of the demonstration was not so violent, but 
the police tried to disperse the uprising and injured students and killed Ahmad 
Quarashi among the protesters. On the following day more than 30,000 marchers, 
led by the university students and chanted anti government slogans in the street of 
Khartoum against the death of Quarashi. Soon on the 26 October, the Abboud 
government had no choice but to hand over power and decided to leave power 
without bloodshed.
75
 
In the aftermath of the “October Revolution”, the transitional government led by 
Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa held a meeting to discuss the issue of Southern Sudan. 
Many politicians agreed that the problem of Southern Sudan was not a secret 
agenda and had to be discussed thoroughly and resolved via political dialogues. 
Therefore, it was this political demonstration that gave a new chapter in the history 
of Southern Sudan. The RTC was held in Khartoum from March 16-29, 1965 and 
was composed of a twelve men committee, 6 from the North and the other 6 from 
the South. Again there was a hot discussion over the past and future relations, 
where the Southerners were demanding for federation and self determination of the 
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region. At the end the conference three options were presented: unconditional unity, 
federation and secession.
76
  
The Southern representatives at the conference were divided as to whether the 
South remained a single political unit or an independent state. The representatives 
of the Southern Sudan fell into four groups called the two factions of SANU, 
Southern Sudan Front (SSF) and the Liberal Party (LP).  The first faction of SANU 
led by William Deng, wanted a federation of Southern Sudan, he stressed that the 
federation of Southern Sudan should be decided by the opinion of the Southern 
people. The other factional group of SANU led by Aggrey Jaden, wanted self-
determination for the people of Southern Sudan and ultimately 
cessation/independence of Southern Sudan. In the conference he presented the 
strongest statement than any other groups.  
He said “there is nothing in common between the North and the South. If you want 
peace between us as neighbors, leave the South, so that we can have our 
independence.”77After the speech he left the conference and went straight to the 
airport. The SSF had a similar political view as SANU (Jaden) in favor of complete 
independence; most of the SSF were supporters of the SANU party. The LP stood 
for the autonomous administration of the Southern Sudan.
78
 All the claims of the 
Southern Sudan were not accepted neither by the transitional government nor by the 
Northern political parties.  
Moreover, during the conference most of the Southern parties were divided on their 
plan, some of them in favour of independence, while the other was in support of 
federation under the umbrella of one Sudan. They could not come up with a unified 
agenda for the independence of Southern Sudan. It is very important to question 
why the Southern leaders did not unite on their goal for the future of Southern 
Sudan. The reason might be many one of the prime problems within the various 
parties was the existence of individual interests over the national interests. Most of 
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the party leaders were obsessed with individual interests, everyone wanted to be a 
leader in the party (a sense of cult leadership).
79
  
The other major problems within the political parties were regional and tribal 
sentiments, particularly among the leaders of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Torit and Juba. On 
several occasions, most of the leaders wanted to represent their own ethnic groups 
rather than thinking as a united nation. Being the leaders of the Southern Sudan 
they were unable to unify in their plan for self determination, these divisions gave a 
viable ground for the central government of Sudan to dismantle the various 
Southern parties easily. For a long time, the government of Khartoum had used 
these political differences as a strategy to divide the South on the basis of class, 
ethnicity and language.
80
 
After a long discussion in the conference, the GOS agreed to give limited regional 
rights to the South and they provided primary education, health service and public 
road constructions in Southern region. In reality the central government would still 
control the main economic, financial, state security and armed forces. The 
conference ended in a deadlock. They did not agree on key issues whether Southern 
Sudan should remain part of Sudan or a self-autonomous state. As Arnold (1991) 
expressed “the 1965 Round Table Conference could have formed the base for a 
peaceful and democratic relationship between the two sides, had it not been for lack 
of mutual confidence and a failure to negotiate in good faith.”81 The mistrust and 
insecurity among the Southern increased after the 1965 parliamentary election. 
Indeed the Southern were not only denied of their proposals at the conference but 
were also ignored to voice their opinions in the parliament. 
On the other hand, scholars like Breidlid, and Malwal argue that despite the 
disunity that prevailed among the Southern Sudan, the representatives of the 
Southern Sudan had presented the wishes and aspirations of the Southern people in 
the conference. Mainly they presented their concerns about the political, 
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educational and economic development of the region. In the conference they sought 
that the administration of the South, the police and prison services should be run 
only by the Southerners. In addition to this they wanted to recruit the Southern 
army and a mixed national army of the North and South.  
In the educational sector, they rejected the policy of Arabization and Islamization in 
the school curriculum mainly in the South Sudan. This policy had been the cause of 
stagnation in the educational advancement of the South. And they also requested 
the immediate opening of girls’ Secondary School, Malakal Secondary School and 
other Technical Institutes in Southern Sudan. Economically, representatives of the 
Southern criticized the GOS for not doing enough to encourage economic 
advancement in the region. There was no attempt made to address the 
unemployment issues and to raise the standard of living of the people. All foreign 
firms interested in the investment of natural resources in South were not permitted 
by the GOS, while Northern capitalists were permitted to invest and monopolize 
huge capital. Therefore, the Southern Front stood for the principle of welfare state 
and equal distribution of the natural resources.
82
   
After the election (1965), the Umma Party came into power, the new elected 
government led by Mohamed Ahmad Mahgoub served as prime minister for a year. 
Soon after the formation of a new government, there were massacres carried out by 
the Sudanese army and the security forces in the town of Juba, Wau, Bor, Yei, 
Torit, Malakal and Yambio because they had been considered as supporters of the 
rebel groups and wanted self determination of the Southern Sudan. This was a clear 
indication that the RTC was a failure in such a way and would not produce a best 
option for peaceful negotiations. As Sadiq-el-Mahdi came to power in 1966 the 
situation in Southern region was aggravated by his Islamic ideology. Sadiq wanted 
that the Sudanese Constitution to be according to the Islamic law. Al-Turabi was 
actively involved in a constitution committee along with other several members of 
the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) to draft the constitution of Sudan.  
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Under the new government led by Turabi was rejected the proposal of a secular 
constitution by the Southern Sudan and other members of the Northern 
intelligentsia. Later on by 15 January 1968 the final draft of the constitution was 
adopted by the National Assembly.
83
 Therefore, as many scholars claim, the failure 
of the RTC caused the people of Southern Sudan to take decisive action at this time 
more than any time before. So, this situation left them with no option but to join the 
fight for their freedom. 
This period also created another opportunity for the Southern Sudan to consider 
their previous weakness and established a better political organization. Colonel 
Joseph Lagu began to accuse and challenge the former leadership of Emilio Taffeng 
who led the Southern movement and eventually he took power and became the new 
supreme commander and he brought all the rival groups together in a more 
comprehensive and organized manner, the Southern Sudanese Liberation 
Movement (SSLM). During this time, the SSLM did hold a large part of Equatoria 
region and after 1969 this rebellion group had managed to represent the Southern 
Sudan in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972).
84
  
After 1969 the SSLM fighters extended military and foreign relations with the 
government of Israel in response to the expansion of Islam in the Southern Sudan. 
They received military training and aid from Israel in collaboration with the 
government of Ethiopia and Uganda. The rebels had tried to create a good contact 
with the Southern people inside Sudan and outside and raised funds for buying 
modern weapons from neighboring countries: Ethiopia, Central Africa Republic and 
Congo in order to increase their military capabilities.
85
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4.2. The Genesis of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA) 
The RTC of 1965 was the first political dialogue to resolve the differences between 
the North and South. It was unproductive, however, the SSLM (former Anya Nya) 
movement stepped up its military attacks against the GOS and established a good 
political network within and outside Sudan. Within the Northern political parties, 
the Communist Party had supported the autonomous status of the Southern people 
and opposed an Islamic constitution in Sudan. During the RTC (1965) and the 1968 
Constitution Committee, the Communist Party was in favour of the Southern 
Regional Administration (SRA). But in the middle of this situation General Jaffar 
Nimeiri deposed the new president of Sudan, Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub through a 
coup in May 1969.
86
  
In a statement to the nation, Nimeiri promised that his government would sincerely 
work for the peace and stability of Sudan. On that specific date (May1969), he 
stated that his government would work for the social justice for all Sudanese people 
including the Southerners and he promised to resolve the failure of the previous 
government to solve the “Southern problem”.87  As Alier the governor of Southern 
Sudan explained the situation, the peace negotiation with Nimeiri could not be 
successful mainly because of two possible reasons. The first reason was that the 
clash between Nimeiri’s regime and the members of the Ansar party led by Al-
Mahdi meant that they could not agree to start a formal negotiation with Southern 
Sudan who was supported by the Israeli government.  It was remembered that the 
GOS supported the Egyptian army during the Arab-Israel war in 1967. The second 
reason was that the political differences between the Nimeiri’s regime and the 
Communist party with regards to the question of the Southern Sudan had a different 
point of view. The Communist party advocated for the autonomy governance of the 
Southern Sudan in the near future.
88
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The leader of the Southern Sudan led by Joseph Oduho and William Deng came up 
with a new concept regarding the “Southern Sudan Problem” and formed a political 
dialogue with a new GOS as a means to achieve permanent peace in the Southern 
Sudan. In a similar way, Nimeiri took the first step to end the civil war between the 
North and South and concluded that it was in his interest to end the civil war and 
foster development in the South. Historians call it this peace treaty between the 
North and South as the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. 
Earlier the GOS held secret meetings with the opposition groups to discuss a 
possible solution to end the conflict. Both Lagu and Nimeiri concluded in a secret 
meeting that the war was becoming too costly and neither side could win a military 
victory. The only way to settle the conflict was by means of political negotiations. 
Strong reactions came to the GOS from the Northern political parties, specifically 
some Muslim groups rejected the peace talks as Nimeiri’s regime gave more 
concession to the Southern Sudan by allowing political “negotiation” and peace 
talks with the rebel group. On the other hand, the Southern politicians criticized 
Lagu for accepting the autonomous status of the Southern Sudan and made 
compromises with the Khartoum government on the independence of Southern 
Sudan. One of the fighters who expressed his reservations on the AAPA was John 
Garang.
89
 Therefore, the AAPA was contentious issues among the Northern and the 
Southern elites  
As part of the peace process, the Nimeiri’s regime played a key role in drafting a 
new document regarding the problem of Southern Sudan and he addressed the three 
main issues: Firstly, he acknowledged there was uneven development between the 
North and South Sudan under the former legacy of the Sudanese government and he 
promised his government would work for everlasting peace and equality between 
the two regions. Secondly, recognizing the “cultural and historical” differences 
between the North and South, so that the Southern might have the right to exercise 
their own culture within a united Sudan and have the right to “regional autonomy”. 
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Thirdly, Nimeiri proposed to extend the rule of law in the South, by inviting all 
Southerners to build a “united and democratic Sudan.”90      
Nimeiri further extended his political reforms toward the South Sudan by 
appointing Alier as vice president and Minister of the Southern affairs in August 
1971 and recruited Southern policemen in the Southern province. In the field of 
economics, he allocated a huge budget for economic recovery and public 
construction in the region. In his educational policy, he opened Secondary Schools 
in major towns of Juba and Malakal and established the department of Christian 
affairs in the Ministry of Education. Nimeiri’s political reforms toward the Southern 
Sudan became a matter of discussion among the Northern politicians. Why did 
Nimeiri want to end the civil war peacefully? In the first place, Nimeiri had served 
as a captain in Juba between 1959 and 1961, when he was in the military service 
and he developed a sense of empathy and understood the discrimination of Southern 
Sudan by the Northern Sudan. According to Anthony Sylvesern, in the 1970s 
Nimeiri’s policy became popular in the South, he was considered as a man who 
guaranteed “a fair deal for the region”.91 Secondly, there was no doubt, however, 
that Nimeiri’s political strategy was to consolidate his power in the North by 
building a peace agreement with the South.   
On 3 March 1972, a peace treaty was signed between the Southern Sudan and GOS 
which was known as the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA). AAPA was 
considered by many scholars as one of Nimeiri’s most significant achievements in 
the history of Sudan since 1970s. The North Sudan began to moderate its pro-
Arabic stand and gave way for a new development in Southern Sudan. The peace 
agreement also invited other regional observers such as the World Council of 
Churches (WCC), All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) and Haile Selassie, the 
Emperor of Ethiopia who had taken a crucial step in the peace agreement. In 
addition to this, I will briefly address what were the legal terms of the AAPA and 
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the views of the Northerners and SSLM during the negotiation process. It is 
important to ask whether the legal terms of the AAPA was a genuine step to narrow 
the difference between the GOS and the rebellion movement (SSLM) in the South.  
4.2.1. The Legal Terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
This section will briefly address some of the legal terms which were ratified by the 
peace agreement. The historic negotiations opened from 16-17 February, 1972 in 
the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel with the blessing of Emperor Haile Selassie. On that 
special day, the Emperor of Ethiopia announced the aim of the peace talk was to 
ratify a plan for regional autonomy of Southern Sudan within a united Sudan, not a 
separate state which was originally demanded by the SSLM. The negotiations in 
Addis Ababa have representative from both sides. The Sudan government sent 9 
men delegation, headed by vice-president and Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel 
Alier and Ezboni Mundiri with other 8 men led the Southern delegation in Addis 
Ababa.
92
 The draft of the AAPA and key points of the agreement and interim 
protocols were as follows: 
- The provinces of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile constituted a 
self-governing region within Sudan and shall be known as the Southern 
Region, based on the boundaries of 1 January 1956 (Article 4) 
- The Southern Region had its own legislative and executive organs (Article 
5). 
- The High-Executive Council (HEC) headed by a president appointed by the 
president of Sudan on the recommendation of the People’s Regional 
Assembly (PRA) such body shall supervise the administrative and direct 
public affairs on the Southern Region (Article 3) 
- The official language of Sudan became Arabic and English to be the 
principal language in Southern Region.
93
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- There was a temporary deal covering the first years where by the armed 
forces in the Southern region would consist of a national force called the 
Southern Command of 12, 000 officers and men of whom 6,000 would come 
from the South and the other 6,000 from the North. 
- Juba was the capital of the Southern Region and the seat of HEC and the 
PRA.
94
 
- All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, 
language, sex, economic, should have equal rights and duties before the 
law.
95
 
-  Every person should enjoy freedom of religion, opinion, and the right to 
profess them openly. 
- There was an extensive section dealing with revenue collection and grants 
for the Southern Region.
96
 For detail information about the protocol see this 
website: 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%
20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Su
dan.pdf   
Many of the participants expressed their rejection of the AAPA, but some 
representatives of the Southern Sudan had contented with the signing of the peace 
agreement. For example Abel Alier representative of the Southern Sudan said “I 
believed I had done my part in bringing both sides together, in formulating key 
policies that brought about the settlement, involved with the talks and helping to 
work out a mutually acceptable settlement.”97 However, Woodward wrote about the 
AAPA while he was a student at the University of Reading, he said that the AAPA 
“was serious of compromise designed to give sufficient regional powers to appease 
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the South, while creating enough ties to bind the region into Sudan as a whole.”98 
Dr. John Garang on similar way supported Woodward’s idea by saying that the 
AAPA was a secrete strategy of Nimeiri to integrate the Anya Nya army into the 
national army and then destroy the Anya Nya forces from the Southern Sudan. 
Therefore, by looking at the various views, it seemed the agreement was very 
radical and ambitious in its nature, while the application of such agreement became 
a major challenge for both contenders in the near future.
99
  
 4.3. The Implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
This section will provide the successful negotiations between the GOS and the 
SSLM the Addis Ababa in 1972 which brought an end to the first Sudanese civil 
war. Although suspicion and tension remained alive on both sides (Nimeiri and 
SSLM), the agreement did provide some basic principles for the rule of law 
(implementation of the agreement) as guiding principles for peace talks between the 
two regions.
100
 The AAPA did accept by Nimeiri as goodwill to end the civil war 
and on 3 March 1972 he announced a formal cease–fire signed between the 
Southern Sudan and GOS. President Nimeiri declared the 3 March 1972 would be a 
holiday known as the “National Unity Day”.  
As Collins describes “it was an historic but flawed agreements, for many of its 
articles were dependent upon mutual trust when there was none.”101 For a few years 
Nimeiri appeared to be a truly national hero, uniting all Sudanese people 
irrespective of ethnicity, religion and cultures. He took a pride in the international 
arena and was highly praised as a peacemaker in a war-torn country, Sudan. 
However, the AAPA was calling both parties to show mutual trust and collective 
work for the peace agreement.  
Under the provision of the AAPA, the GOS appointed Abel Alier to be the 
president of HEC and PRA in South Sudan. The GOS declared a self-governing of 
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Southern Sudan (the provinces of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile 
within a united, Socialist Sudan). Within a few days Alier had selected his cabinet 
of eleven regional ministers seven of whom were exiled politicians, and the 
remaining politicians were from inside Sudan. HEC and PRA had the authority to 
deal with a specified list of regional matters that is maintenance of public order, 
internal security, efficient administration and the promotion of economic, social and 
cultural progress. In a real sense, the GOS had the upper hand in decision making 
by a two-third majority vote in the PRA and that gave the government unlimited 
power to determine and make decisions on the issue of Southern Sudan. Therefore, 
Nimeiri took advantage of this lack of lucidity to intervene on the issue of the 
Southern Sudan.
102
  
The other immediate issue facing this fragile government was the repatriation and 
resettlement of millions of Southerners in the refugee camps and internally 
displaced in Southern Sudan. In order to tackle the refugee crisis, Repatriation and 
Relief Commission was established to receive returnees coming from neighboring 
countries and resettle them to their homes. The United Nations High Commission 
for Refugee (UNHCR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Oxfam, Catholic Relief 
Organization (CRO) and the Red Cross remained active in Southern Sudan and 
provided shelters, vaccination, basic education and medical assistance for the 
refugee and war affected communities.
103
  
In March 1972, the UN Secretary General asked the UNHCR to release 
humanitarian aid in the Southern Region of Sudan, aimed at the return and 
rehabilitation of approximately 500,000 persons displaced within Southern Sudan 
and some 180,000 refugees who were expected to repatriate from neighboring 
countries of Ethiopia, Congo and Uganda. Moreover, the UNHCR further 
strengthened an airlift between the North and South and the construction of the 
Bailey bridge along the Nile River, technical assistance for agricultural schemes 
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and access to health care assistance.
104
 Without the help of these NGOs, it would 
not have been attainable for the GOS to rehabilitate half a million of Southern-
refugees inside and outside Southern Sudan, because the GOS had experienced a 
brutal civil war and became difficult for the GOS to heal the wounds of the past. In 
many ways the GOS failed to allocate the appropriate budget to the Southern region 
to cover the basic needs of the people.  
Moreover, the GOS opened a number of projects to recover the economic status of 
the Southern Sudan and the GOS gained huge amount of loans from the 
international financial institutions like the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the oil rich countries. More specifically, Kuwait donated 
a vast budget for the development of the Southern Sudan and had opened an office 
in Juba, the Kuwait’s Development Contribution (KDC). The construction of the 
Jonglei Canal Project (175 miles between Jonglei and Malakal) was another 
significant development in the history of Southern Sudan because the canal was 
intended to enrich the flow of the White Nile River between the North and Egypt 
and to increase the agricultural output between the two countries. However, 
Southern politicians thought the construction of the canal was not aimed for the 
benefit of the South, but to enhance the economic development in the North.
105
  
In addition, some Southern leaders were highly critical of the project, fearing that 
the project could have an effect in the swampy Sudd area which would drain 
pastures and dry up wells and undermine the Dinka’s pastoral life style in the 
region. Despite demonstrations against the scheme in Juba in October 1974 and 
wider criticism came from the Southern leaders (John Garang and Abiel Alier) and 
environmentalists, the Nimeiri government ratified the implementation of the 
project. This was another sign in which application of the AAPA was fragile and 
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weak by which the Nimeiri regime tried to violate the rule of law without 
requesting the will of the Southerners.
106
 
The other major challenges to the implementation of the AAPA was that the 
reintegration of the rebel fighters into the Sudanese army forces. As it was agreed in 
the AAPA, the armed forces in the Southern Sudan would consist of 12,000 
national forces of which 6,000 came from the Southern Sudan. In a practical sense, 
the agreement ratified an equal composition of armies from both sides might join 
into the United Southern National Army (USNA) and an equal number of soldiers 
from both sides should be recruited in Khartoum to safeguard the country.  
It is very important to question here how far the Southern government trusted the 
Nimeiri’s regime and was committed to give some of its soldiers to reintegrate in 
the army. As I have mentioned it earlier some of the Southern politicians were very 
skeptical about the integration of the Ex-Anya Nya forces with the Northern army. 
Particularly, John Garagn and other exiled politicians expressed their objection that 
the integration of Anya Nya forces into the national army was Nimeiri’s first 
strategy to weaken the Southern army.
107
  
Another important issue related to the transitional government was to prepare the 
way for the first general election to take place in November 1973. In a number of 
districts and towns registration of voters had taken place in the early 1973. As part 
of this process national census was also carried out in major villages and towns. 
Despite the poor infrastructure and unorganized voting system, this election was 
expected to develop confidence among the difference groups of citizens in the 
Southern region and different ethnic groups to form a new government based on 
equality, dignity and mutual respect.  
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The long trauma, mistrust and cruelty caused over many years of conflict had to be 
consciously replaced by a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness.
108
 The 1974 
election of the PRA, many Southerners began to feel the effect of the Southern 
government exerting power and authority over region of the South.  There was a 
widespread sense of stability and peace and people could travel easily between 
cities and rural areas for trade, paid work, and to seek other kind of services.  
4.4.  The Politics of Southern Sudan during the Peace Agreement 
4.4.1. The First Regional Government 1974-1978 
As I referred in the previous section, the October 1973 election gave Mr. Abel Alier 
the mandate to establish the first elected Southern Regional Government (SRG) that 
lasted up to December 1977. As Breidlid and others claim despite poor economic 
developments and indirect interference from the GOS, the regional assembly 
managed to implement some basic development programs in the area of Education, 
Agriculture, roads and communications through the support of international 
partners and NGO’s.  
In supporting Breidlid’s point of view, Nyibong argues that during the first regional 
government, the South exercised no autonomy in economic or educational sectors 
and the regional government received quite a little amount of money yearly of an 
average of 23.2% Pound from the central government for the development of South 
Sudan. As a result of this, few development programs ever really got under way. In 
addition many Southern veterans of the Anya Nya movement were not satisfied 
with the Southern government because the GOS failed to fulfill its promise to grant 
them positions and repatriation.
109
  
Moreover, this period also witnessed a major political rivalry among the Southern 
Sudan leaders who were not satisfied with the governance of Abel Alier. One of the 
reasons for the disagreement was that Aliers’s dismissal of four ministers in 1974 
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and the arrest of these famous leaders within his political party (Oduhu and 
Clement Mbore), this heightened the tension. The opposition against Alier was 
uniquely strong among the Equatorians. Many Equatorians thought that the 
government in Southern Sudan was dominated by the Dinka senior politicians. The 
Dinka, however, felt discriminated not only by the Alier government but also 
throughout the colonial times. In 1978 his former opponent Joseph Lagu was 
unanimously elected as the president of the HEC and indeed he was supported by 
Nimeiri. The GOS took this opportunity to support Lagu’s political power as a 
means to weaken and divide the government in South.
110
 
4.4.2. The Second Regional Government 1978-1980 
Lagu’s election in 1978 was expected to balance the ethnic issue and to drive 
forward the social, economic and political administration of Southern people. 
Unfortunately Joseph Lagu did not success on major issues. Moreover, this period 
was expressed as a period of rival tension between the two prominent leaders in the 
Southern administration. The different political attitudes between the two leaders, 
divided the people of the Southern Sudan on the basis of class and tribal sentiments. 
Lagu was part of a military bureaucratic hierarchy, being trained in the national 
army and had a status as a soldier during the war. Alier was an elected politician 
before being made a minister by the Nimeiri in 1972. To make things worse both 
had a different ethnic background, Lagu was from a small community of Equatorian 
tribe, while Alier was from Bor and the Dinka tribe. This political difference was 
becoming one of the most important steps for Nimeiri to disintegrate the Southern 
people on the basis of ethnic differences.
111
 
Moreover, according to Collins the SRA could not create job opportunities for the 
repatriated Anya Nya army. More than 20,000 armed forces of the Anya Nya faced 
serious challenges in getting jobs in Juba and Khartoum, if the former soldiers 
continued without any job sooner or later they would take their arms and fight the 
GOS. Unlike Collins, Harir and Tvedt, argue that both the GOS and SRG could 
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narrow the gap between the insiders and the new comers (Equatorians refugees). In 
relation to this a number of Equatorians had returned from Uganda following the 
fall of the former president Idi Amin in Uganda. The Equatorians were serving in 
various government positions in Uganda during the Amin’s reign and now they 
sought exile in Southern Sudan after the fall of Amin’s reign in Uganda. These 
people expected to get some jobs in their homeland after they came back from exile 
but they did not get anything, consequently, this led to a conflict and power struggle 
between the “returnees” and the “insiders”.112 
The administration of Lagu was accused of corruption and interference in the 
legislative and judicial system of the Southern administration. The unconstitutional 
use of power both in the legislative and judicial system really gave a way for 
president Nimeiri to easily intervene in the HEC of the Southern Sudan. Nimeiri 
and other politicians like Clement Mboro, Bona Malwal and Abiel Alier accused 
Lagu of corruption and ill political leadership in the regional administration. 
Eventually Lagu lost his influence in the South. Then in 1980 president Nimeiri 
used this excuse to unconstitutionally dissolve the SRA in Juba and to dismiss Lagu 
from power.
113
  
4.4.3. The Third Regional Government 1980-1983 
The election to the Third Regional Assembly took place by the end of May 1980 
and brought Abel Alier back to his position as the head of HEC. Still the tribal 
rivalries were some of the core divisions within the Southern region. By this time 
many Equatorians were given an equal share of representation in the new cabinet 
election. He was concerned mostly with domestic issues and expanding programs 
which begun during his first term of presidency such as agricultural development, 
education and health care. The greatest disappointment for the Southern 
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government was lack of economic development and it was totally dependent upon 
the GOS.
114
 
Many Southern leaders accused the GOS for ignoring to allocate appropriate budget 
to increase the financial sector of the region. As a result by 1981 Nimeiri had no 
longer denied complaints of the Southerners, he sent the minister of finance, Badr 
al-Din Sulayman to the South and he agreed to open a branch office of Agricultural 
and Commercial Bank in Juba. Soon the GOS provided $ 9 million from the 
Kuwaiti Fund to rebuild the Zande Cotton Project at Nzara. Despite all these 
efforts, the people of Southern Sudan were unable to come out of poverty, 
corruption and lack of unity among the Southern leaders.
115
 During the period of 
1980s one of the major issues of contention was the issue of division or union of the 
Southern Sudan. Lagu, the former general of the Sudanese army wanted the 
division/decentralization of the Southern Sudan into three regions. Basically, his 
argument was “that the backwardness of Southern Sudan was due to the 
unmanageable size of the region and the remoteness of Juba, the regional 
capital.”116 
Many Southerners believed that decentralization of the Southern region would 
develop the regions (Equatoria, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile) uniformly. In his 
publication, Decentralization (1980), Lagu presented his opposition to the 
domination and growth of Dinka politicians in the regional government of the 
Southern Sudan, therefore, his main focus was on the decentralization of the 
regional and local economic structure. The tribal factor within the regional 
administration also reflected the different viewpoints and attitudes towards the 
state, the state administration and bureaucracy between the two main political rivals 
of Alier and Lagu.  
On the other hand, Alier was more concerned about creating a bureaucratic 
government structures and regulations than Lagu. During his presidential time, 
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Alier focused on the development of democracy, institutions, and bureaucracy 
based on the Western style. However, Lagu rejected the idea of democracy and 
bureaucratic system in the Southern Sudan. He said that the Southern citizens had 
been a ‘victim of officialdom’, so they should therefore be liberated from 
institutional oppression.”117 
In 1981 the Regional Administration of South received a moral puff, in which 
twelve members of the National Assembly requested Nimeiri to dissolve the 
Southern government and the division of the South. Already the GOS had exploited 
the weakness within the Southern government. On October 5, 1981 both the 
Regional Assembly and HEC were dissolved and Alier’s administration was also 
dismissed. Then Nimeiri appointed a new interim administration headed by Major 
General Gismalla Abdalla Rasa. He was a friend of Lagu and was supporting the 
division of Southern Sudan. Unlike the other leaders of the Southern Sudan, he was 
a novice (inexperienced) politician in the history and politics of Southern Sudan. 
His main task was to supervise the referendum on the division of the Southern 
Sudan.
118
  
The reactions in the South were mixed. The people in favor of a re-division 
generally supported the closure of the SRA and the others saw it as part of a 
political strategy by Northerners to divide the South. The struggle between the two 
fronts made Nimeiri postpone the issue of division, but the GOS dissolved both the 
regional and national assembly and announced a new election in April 1982. In 
December 1982 president Nimeiri once again toured the Southern region, at one 
time he was considered as the peace maker of Sudan in 1972, but now he met a very 
fierce resistance against his regime. Students demonstrated by throwing stones, and 
invaded the HEC office in Juba, schools, shopping complexes and other business 
activities were destroyed.
119
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Despite of all this, the GOS quickly submitted the recommendations for the division 
of the South into three provinces that was called the Southern Regional Self-
Government Act (SRSGA). The dissolution of Alier’s government and the 
dismissal of HEC had clearly shown the beginning of Nimeiri’s abrogation of the 
AAPA, which created mass uprising to his government. In May 1983, military 
grievances, failure to pay salaries and transfer of soldiers from the South to North, 
eventually led to a mutiny in Bor, escalating violence in Southern Sudan.  
Later on many mutineers joined the rebel army in Ethiopia (the Anya Nya II 
rebels), that meant the beginning of the Sudan’s Second civil war. Dr. John Garang 
began a long process of consolidating his control over the SPLM under the 
Ethiopian sponsorship. In a political manifesto in 1983, the SPLM announced a new 
war against the GOS and its intention to fight for a “New Sudan” of economic, 
social and political equality and rejected the division of Southern Sudan.
120
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Chapter V: Factors for the failure of 
the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
5.1. Prelude 
Before I am going to discuss the reasons that led to the failure of the AAPA, it is 
very important to look at the nature of the agreements and how the Sudanese 
scholars analyzed the peace agreement during the initial stage. Although some 
scholars saw a positive development in the AAPA, other scholars were skeptical to 
the peace agreement. For example, Nyaba describes this peace agreement as one in 
which the “South became a sub-system of the Nimeiri regime….an island of liberal 
democracy in an ocean of one party dictatorship and the personal rule of Nimeiri…. 
which lacked or was denied the economic power and resources to develop the 
region.”121 For the Southern elites, managing the autonomous institutions in Juba 
gave them more challenges than chances, particularly in the field of administration, 
sharing economic resources and education.  
Besides this, the Addis Ababa peace talks gave Southerners the first opportunity to 
govern themselves in modern institutions but that opportunity was not effectively 
used by the Southern leaders. Rather it opened up a chance to fight for power on the 
basis of ethnic, sectarian and regional lines over the political system of South 
Sudan. For a number of years the power of politics in Southern Soudan revolved 
around the dominant figure of Joseph Lagu, Equatorian region, and the Abel Alier, 
the Dinka. During the leadership of Alier (1972-1978), there was economic and 
political dominancy by the Dinka elites at the expense of Equatorians. Nimeiri took 
advantage of these weaknesses and transformed the HEC into a subsystem of his 
leadership in which he dismissed the leaders and promoted new leaders who were 
loyal to his government.
122
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It is very useful to look at how politicians argue about the AAPA and their views 
upon the practical application of the peace treaty. One of the leading figures on 
relations between the North and South was Mohammed Omer Beshir, who served 
as secretary of the 1965 RTC. He wrote in his book which was published a year 
later, “it would be fair to conclude that during the first year following the agreement 
both the Northern and Southern Sudanese accepted the challenges of peace.”123 
Beshir considered that the AAPA and the aftermaths of the agreement were the 
beginning of a more difficult and complex assignment-the advancement of 
economic and social services in the South and consolidation of the political unity of 
the Sudan. Politically speaking, the AAPA was a major achievement of Nimeiri’s to 
stabilize and unite Sudan as one nation. 
In response to the above argumentation, another famous figure in the history of 
Sudan is Nelson Kasfir, who was teaching at Dartmouth College in 1977 and was a 
former president of the Sudan Studies Association in USA. He made a political 
analysis on the issue of African Affairs in 1977. In that report he said that only four 
years after the signing of the AAPA (1976), the GOS, Southern leaders and regional 
governments remained committed in making the peace settlement to succeed. The 
agreements formed the rules for postwar politics in the South and became visible to 
be gaining a permanent and practical role in the political system of Sudan. Later on 
many obstacles put the agreement in danger.
124
 Basically he argued that although 
the GOS and the Southern leaders had agreed to establish a permanent peace in 
Sudan there was no real commitment by the government of Khartoum to keep the 
agreement on track and tackle the various problems within the Southern region.  
He further pointed out that continuous suspicion of the South over the North and a 
few scattered incidents served as reminders that the civil wars in Sudan could not be 
entirely resolved by a single treaty. For instance popular uprising toward the 
“Jonglei Construction” and wide spread protest of the Southerners against the GOS 
in Juba (1974) indicated that the peace agreement was in danger. The other 
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potential threat to the peace agreement between the North and South Sudan was the 
integration of the Anya-Nya fighters in the National Army of Sudan, that lead to the 
‘Akoba incident’ where former Anya Nya soldiers staged mutiny in 1973-1974, and 
many of these guerrilla fighters and other top officials played a significant role 
when the fighting resumed in the 1980s.
125
  
Prior to the collapse of the AAPA in 1981, Nimeiri’s minister of Culture and 
Information Bona Malwal wrote a book about the North-South relations. Malwal 
points out the three immediate problems in the relationship between the North and 
South: the role of religion in national politics, the system of government and the 
nature of economic and social development. He expressed his concern that certain 
Northern Sudanese were pushing a head to create an Islamic state in Southern 
Sudan while rejecting the right of Southern Sudanese to exercise their own religion.  
He also thought that the creation of a multi-party system within single-party of 
Sudan, encouraged the formation of several other autonomy regions in Sudan. 
Finally, he was concerned that Sudan was not distributing its wealth fairly and 
lacked efficient leaders to administer all parts of the country.
126
 With this 
background information in mind, I will discuss some of the points of how the peace 
agreement came to an end and off course under this chapter I will present some of 
the factors which contributed to the collapse of the AAPA. This includes the social, 
political, economic and military issues related to the AAPA. 
 5.2. Security issues 
This section examines previous experiences with disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of South Sudan. The provision of the AAPA 1972 (Article 2) says that 
“the people’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force 
called the Southern command composed of 12, 000 officers and men of whom 
6,000 shall be citizens from the region and the other 6,000 from outside the 
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region.”127 Under this agreement both parties agreed to establish the Southern 
Armed Forces (SAF) from both sides, still some questions remained unclear for 
example how the recruitment of citizens from the Southern region with armed 
forces should be determined and in what way they could achieve smooth integration 
of former Anya Nya combatants in the SAF.  
Moreover, the agreement included the recruitment and integration of former Anya 
Nya soldiers from the Southern region within the People’s Armed Forces (PAF) in 
the Southern region. The joint military commission was to ensure smooth 
integration of the Anya Nya soldiers in the national force and by way of doing, it 
guaranteed peace in Sudan.
128
 These questions were not discussed thoroughly 
during the peace agreement as a result mass protests were conducted in Juba, Bor 
and other part of the Southern region.   
The failure of the agreement had already been anticipated by those who were 
involved in making the agreement. Mr. Abel Alier, the key negotiator in the peace 
agreement pointed out that it had been observed that the security agreement reached 
between the North and South Sudan was one of the most sensitive and challenging 
ones and had severely difficult issues to be resolved during the negotiation at the 
AAPA. Both sides did not trust each other due to the bad record of the oppression 
and atrocities created by the Northern Sudan in the early times, which made the 
Anya Nya fighters difficult to integrate in the national army. And during the RTC 
negotiations in 1965, the Southern political parties had systematically marginalized 
by the Northern politicians led by Al-Turabi and were not even invited for the 
coming parliamentary elections in the country.
129
 Therefore, all this political 
developments were made less effective for the smooth integration of the Southern 
Army. 
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A report project paper written by Gakmar (1972) says that one of the most 
significant achievements of the AAPA was the absorption of Anya Nya into the 
regular army and police forces. 6000 guerrillas were absorbed into the Sudanese 
armed forces, leaving 32,000 to be absorbed into civil jobs. In supporting Gakmar’s 
point of view, Abel Alier claims that shortly after the agreement was signed, a 
number of Anya Nya forces bulged from about 12,000 to some 18,000 men, in the 
hope of getting a better job in the regular forces. The GOS also motivated the Anya 
Nya forces to surrender their arms in exchange of money, food and better positions 
but many of the Anya Nya refused to join the national army because surrendering 
their army to GOS was considered to be a shame for them.
130
 
Nelson Kasfir disagrees with Gakmar by saying that there was a widespread belief 
in the continuous violation of the AAPA by the government of Khartoum on 
military issues. He added that “the mixing of soldiers from two recruitment streams 
in the same units under a single chain of command at the field level had become the 
most dangerous issue in the implementation of the agreement.”131 Therefore, the 
process of reintegration of ex-combatants became a difficult task under the 
provision of AAPA. Although it was under control for a short time, serious violent 
incidents soon spread across the Southern region.  
For example Captain Agwet an ex Anya Nya military, started a military operation 
and when his senior ex Anya Nya officers tried to convince him to order his troops 
to put down their weapons, he disobeyed and ordered the troops to shoot down the 
Sudanese forces and senior Anya Nya officers. After the incident most of the 
soldiers fled to neighboring country, Ethiopia. In addition to the above incidents, a 
number of ex Anya Nya soldiers who were peacefully integrated into the national 
army, later on resisted the policy of reintegration as the government of Khartoum 
ordered Kapoeta’s and Rumbek’s Anya Nya battalion to transfer them from the 
Southern region to Khartoum. Many of the Southerners believed that the transfer of 
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soldiers was a political game of the North to dismantle and exterminate the Anya 
Nya forces in the Southern region.
132
 
In relation to this, there were a number of incidents which erupted throughout the 
region mainly in Juba (1974), Wau (1974) and Akobo (1975). These incidents 
primarily erupted due to the policy of reintegration and lack of job, facilities, 
education and health service among the former Anya Nya combatants. Moreover, 
the GOS was unable to pay the wages of the ex-Anya Nya workers (10,000) and 
many of them were ordered to leave their jobs. As a result, most of the soldiers 
were angry because they could not go back to their home with empty hands and 
some of them tried to go back to their village to cultivate their lands but many of 
other ex-combatants wanted to pick up their arms and fight for their rights.  
It should be noted that the AAPA was expected to create a viable ground for peace 
between the North and South. However, it brought substantial critique among the 
Southern elites. Dr. John Garang one of the observers of the AAPA, said “the peace 
agreement was a deal between the Southern and Northern bourgeosified 
bureaucratic elite and that the Northern elite dictated the terms while the Southern 
elite compromised the interest of the masses in return for jobs which had long been 
denied to them.”133 In addition, it had been argued that the agreement was made 
between the government and former Southern officers, who had joined the rebels 
not for the sake of nationalistic motives but to escape the mass atrocity which was 
indiscriminately aimed at the Southerners.  
Other scholars like Kasfir and Alier noted that the military relationships between 
the North and South were causing more tension than any other issues in the peace 
agreement. They added there was a widespread tension due to the continuous 
violation of the AAPA by the GOS on military issues. The military relationship 
began to deteriorate between the GOS and Southern military offices on the transfer 
of soldier from the South to the North Sudan. In May 1983, units of soldiers in the 
Bor, Pibor and Pochalla garrisons in the Upper Nile rejected the security policy of 
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the Sudan’s government and soon the government tried to crush the mutiny by 
sending Special Forces to the region. Many of the Anya Nya combatants had fled to 
the neighboring country of Ethiopia and joined the small Anya Nya II forces, while 
others formed the core of the SPLM/A that Garang had created in Ethiopia. By July 
1983, there were about 2,500 ex-Anya Nya soldiers who fled to Ethiopia and joined 
the army, another 500 gathered in the field of Bahr-el-Ghazal.
 134
  
Reviewing the failure of the AAPA, the key players and mediators in the peace 
process particularly, the Emperor of Ethiopia, representatives of the All African 
Churches and other regional bodies did not discuss the political structures of the 
South Sudan. It seems, the very nature of the agreement did not define what it 
meant by “autonomy status” of the Southern region in relation to the Sudan’s 
socialist party in the North. They did not analyze the political differences between 
the Northern and Southern Sudan. The Northern Sudan was led by the rule of one 
party-the Sudan’s Socialist Party, while the Southern Sudan had given the 
opportunity to form a multi party system within one country. Two different political 
structures within one state would not speed up the integration of Southern troops 
with their counter part in the North. This sensitive security issue was not discussed 
at the peace agreement.
135
 
The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie would not advocate an independent state 
of South Sudan but would support the regional autonomy of South Sudan. By doing 
so his intention was to tackle the issue of secessionist movements within his 
country, Eritrea or elsewhere in Africa. Consequently, the intention of Ethiopia was 
to give Nimeiri unlimited powers over the South by allowing the regional autonomy 
of South Sudan. Therefore the reintegration processes of the Anya Nya combatants 
to the PAF were impossible from the very beginning because the Southern Sudan 
were conscious and suspicious about Nimeiri’s intention to dismantle the Southern 
army in the long run.    
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 5.3. Economic Aspects 
Uneven economic development between the North and South was an important 
reason to the collapse of AAPA. The difference in economic prosperity between the 
North and South was vivid, indeed this peace agreement attempted to readdress 
these differences. This was a difficult task for the GOS and the newly established 
governor of the Southern region. The Southern government at this time should have 
prioritized the influx of refugees from the neighboring countries, creating a better 
condition for the ex- Anya Nya combatants including the process of demobilization, 
reintegration and salaries.  
Under the provision of the AAPA 1972, Chapter IV and Article 11 highlighted the 
establishment of maintenance, administration of public sectors, promotion of trade 
and establishment of local industries in the Southern region. And Chapter VII and 
Article 25 also focused on the source of income for the SRA would be generated 
from the national treasury and by collecting source of revenue from direct and 
indirect regional taxes.
136
 
Based on the above premises, the SRG put its objectives in practice by increasing 
food production in the South with a view of achieving self-sufficiency, encouraging 
cultivation of cash crops with the aim of increasing commercial output and 
expanding communication and network system related to development. During the 
first Six Years Plan, the budget for the Southern Sudan increased from 4.1 million 
pounds in 1972/1973 to 10.0 million pounds in 1976/77.
137
The estimated total 
financial assistance received by the Southern government was 24.7 out of 38.300 
million pounds given for the development of the region. The amount of these funds 
did not sustain the economic development in the region. Compared to the annual 
GDP of the GOS, the Southern region only received 20% of the national budget, 
this means that the Southern region only received a small portion of money from 
the national budget.  
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Despite this, Bure claims that from 1972-1977 there was a number of projects 
implemented by the GOS in Southern region. However, the central government was 
more interested in large scale projects within Blue Nile state such as Gezira 
plantation, Mongola Agro Industry, and Nzara Agro Industrial complex, many 
Southerners thought that such development was manipulated by the GOS as a 
means to generate foreign currency to the Northern part of Sudan. However, 
Johnson disagrees with the above claim, by saying that there was not much 
development in Southern Sudan during 1972-1977 due to the lack of skilled man 
power, technical problems related to administration and corruption by the Southern 
government made the development projects unsuccessful.
138
  
According to the information from the Juba Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (1977), in July 1977, the regional government began the implementation 
of another Six-Year Plan for economic and social development of the South. For 
this project the central government allocated $225 million for the development in 
the Southern Sudan. However, the inflation increased the development costs 
because of the worldwide price rises and rising costs of external capital. During the 
plan’s second year, 1978, there was no economic growth in the South Sudan as a 
result, the region was badly affected by the economic situation and the Sudan 
government was unable to pay its debts to the US and IMF.
139
  
According to Johnson, this situation had an impact on the internal and external 
political system of the country.  Sudan became increasingly dependent on the US 
not only to negotiate the rescheduling of the Sudan’s debt and further loans from 
the IMF, but for the foreign aids through USAID (Sudan was the largest recipient of 
US foreign aid in sub-Sahara Africa, receiving more than $1.4 billion in all). 
Internally, Nimeiri brought back his Islamist opponents (the Umma and the Muslim 
Brotherhood) in order to ensure his political stability in the country and he open up 
Islamic bank (free of interest rate). Due to this, the US and IMF imposed sanctions 
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on their financial support and that resulted in reduction of the national budget and 
privatization of the national companies.
140
 
By the early 1980s the GOS had spent only $45 million for development in the 
South accordingly the government cut down major development expenditures in the 
Southern region. After GOS called for the “National Reconciliation” and Nimeiri 
reformed the previous laws regarding the economic, social and political structure of 
North and South Soudan, particularly they aimed at dividing the Southern region 
into three regions. The disintegration of the SRA was the final blow to economic 
development of the region, this policy left the Southern region without independent 
sources of revenue. It endorsed the economic power in the hands of the central 
government and practically wrecked the economic independence of the South.
141
  
5.4.  The Adoption of Shar’a 
In this section, I will discuss the role of religion in breaking down the relationship 
between the North and the South Sudan, which ultimately led to the collapse of the 
AAPA. Moreover, The AAPA of 1972 guaranteed the Southern people the freedom 
of religion in the country. In light of the agreement the GOS and the Southern 
Sudan agreed:  
….“every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of 
conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to 
establish religious institutions subjected to reasonable limitation in favor of 
the morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.”142 
After the first six years of rule, Nimeiri had achieved major success in creating 
temporary peace between the people of the North and the South. He had ended the 
first civil war through a political dialogue and mediation, while maintaining the 
unity and integrity of the country. His accomplishments, however was not liked by 
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the Northern politicians. Many politicians accused him of his autocratic rule and 
suppression of political parties from both the left and the right.
143
  
The growing resistance within the Northern part of Sudan and the decline of 
economic progress in the country caused Nimeiri to revise his former policy. As a 
result he turned the country into an Islamic state. However, scholars disagree with 
Nimeiri’s new policy and why he turned Sudan into an Islamic state. It was true that 
the new policy that was adopted by Sudanese government definitely affected the 
early peace agreement (AAPA) of 1972.  One scholar, Natsion (2012) argues that 
the growing of mass underground movement against his government forced him to 
consider his previous policy.  
In 1971 there was an underground coup d'état against the GOS Sudan led by the 
Sudanese Communist Organization. The aspiration of the coup was to overthrow 
Nimeiri from power and to establish an Islamic state in Sudan. The coup was 
suppressed by the Sudanese security forces and its effect led to the massacre of the 
Ansar Army, the killing of Imam al-Hadi and driving Sadiq al-Mahdi out of the 
country.  
Furthermore, Natsios and Warburg (2003) stress that the opposition to Nimeiri’s 
regime did not stop after the crushing of the Ansar Army (1971). The growing of 
resistance against him ever increased. For example in July 2, 1976, another coup 
attempt inspired by the Ansar Army against him at the Airport of Khartoum as he 
was returning to Sudan from a trip to the United States. The agenda of the coup was 
to assassinate the president and his officers. However, the plane arrived earlier 
before the time of the plot. After the failure of this coup, the various leaders of the 
coup including Sadiq al-Mhadi were creating political alliances with the former 
enemies of Nimeiri such as Colonel Gaddafi (Libya), Mengistu Haile Mariam 
(Ethiopian) and the Soviet Union.
144
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These countries provided them with weapons, funds and bases of operations to 
support the coup. The ground troops came from two sources: first Sadiq al Mahdi’s 
Ansar army from Darfur and the second, the Arab Legion, recruited and organized 
by Gaddafi to spread Gaddafi’s grand strategy for expanding Arabization in the 
Sahara region. Therefore, Nimeiri had no option but to address his political 
dilemma and to tackle the internal opposition within the country.  The only way to 
come out of this situation was the adoption of Islam as a political agenda to Sudan 
and by opening political dialogues with various Islamic political parties for the 
unity of Sudan.
145
 
Other scholars, such as Johnson (2011) and Kebbede (1977) claim that it was not 
only the political resistances that made Nimeiri to introduce Shar’a as means to 
solve the crisis in Sudan but the economic recession of Sudan in the 1970’s. Sudan 
enjoyed a period of relative tranquility and stability by the mid of 1970s. In the 
years following the AAPA, Nimeiri dismissed his former communist allies and 
shifted from earlier Soviet disposition to alignment with the Western World and 
Modern Arab countries.  
The country began to attract foreign investments and obtained massive loans from 
the Western countries and turned Sudan into the “breadbasket of the Middle 
East.”146 At one time Sudan became one of the fewest countries in Africa that 
received a huge military aid in Africa after Egypt. After 1976, however, Nimeiri’s 
popularity began to deteriorate as the country’s economic situation got worse. The 
country’s economy was badly affected by the rise of oil price, recession, inflation 
and mismanagement and corruption. It became a major problem in the country.  
As the world’s economy collapsed due to the fall in major commodities during 
1976, the international financial institutions intervened and imposed serious 
measures on the nation’s economy (money devaluation, reducing subsidies, lifting 
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prices, increasing cash crop exports, raising interest rate, freezing wage).
147
 Thus, 
by the early 1980s the GOS had spent very little money for the development of 
South Sudan. Therefore, this was perhaps one of the main reasons behind the 
adoption of Islam by Nimeiri. If the GOS unanimously introduced Shar’a law as the 
constitution of the country, in return the country would get financial assistance from 
the rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
It seems both economic and political factors caused Nimeiri to stick on the 
application of Islam and economic cooperation with the Arab countries. However, 
the question is how the introduction of Shar’a and the economic depression affected 
the situation of Southern Sudan? And how did the slow economic growth in the 
early 1970s affect the Southern people? The introduction of Shar’a or the adoption 
of Islam shaped the economic, social and political situation of the Southern 
Sudan.
148
  
In July 1977, Nimeiri openly declared a political dialogue (Reconciliation) with his 
political rival Hassan al-Turabi the leader of Ansar Army. At one time Turabi had 
been sentenced to death as he plotted an attempt to assassinate the president of 
Sudan in 1976.  In a secret meeting Nimeiri promised to renegotiate the key 
provisions of the AAPA, since Hassan al-Turabi and his allies did not support the 
regional autonomy of South Sudan. In addition to this, they agreed to root out the 
Southern troops in a systematic way. Al-Turabi wanted to establish a secular 
constitution for Sudan based on Islamic law and Arabic language would be the 
official language of country. If Nimeiri aimed to hold the Islamic parties within his  
administration, he would lead the country once again into a devastative civil war 
and he would lose his popularity among the Southern Sudan, which means the 
AAPA agreement would be in a very precarious condition.
149
  
As part of the Reconciliation process, Hassan al-Turabi used his new legal position 
to advance his own religious agenda in Sudan. By 1980 with the intention of 
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Islamization of Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF) officially declared the use 
of “jallabiya”, prohibition of alcohol drinking, mutilation of limbs for theft and 
violent crime. In short, Islam became an integral part of Sudan’s political, social, 
civil, criminal and economic lifestyle. Likewise, the new criminal and legal code of 
the Shari’a applied to all Sudanese, Northerners and Southerners, Christians or 
Muslims.
150
 
Gradually, the Shar’a law was applied into the Southern region and most of the 
penal codes were being applied normally against the Southerners and Western 
Christians. Christian missionaries were being suspended by the GOS in major cities 
and towns in the South and Arabic language were introduced as a medium of 
instruction in various primary and high schools. Therefore, the application of Shar’a 
was a major blow to the AAPA and the Constitution of 1973, and it therefore 
became the immediate cause to the second civil war led by the SPLM/A.
151
 
5.5. The discovery of Oil 
This sub-topic is more related to the economic crisis that I have discussed earlier. 
The discovery of oil in the Southern Sudan had also contributed a lot and it sparked 
fire to the ongoing tension between the two people. Since the establishment of the  
AAPA, the Northern politicians and the various leaders of Khartoum were 
concerned very little about the political, social and economic development of the 
South. The exploration of oil became a major source of tension between the 
Northern and Southern Sudan and it became particularly apparent after the 
establishment of AAPA. The exploration of oil was begun in 1964 by the Italian gas 
company Agip and the exploration was unsuccessful in its first stage. Later on in 
1974, the Chevron Shell Company took its second phase and began its exploration 
in the Red Sea Zone (Muglad), along the region of Abyei and Malakal in Southern 
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Sudan. Moreover, by the late 1978 oil was discovered in Bentiu within the region of 
the South.
152
  
In relation to this, we need to answer two important questions. The first question is 
whether the discovery of oil/natural resource was part of the deal in the AAPA or 
not? Secondly, how the discovery of oil affected the AAPA in 1972. The AAPA 
permitted the SRA to utilize their natural resources and extract profit. However, the 
GOS broke the agreement by allowing the exploration of Chevron Company 
without the consent of the Southern people and the GOS did not discuss about the 
exploration of oil in Bentiu with the Southern politicians.  
According to the Northern politicians, one of the obvious reasons why the GOS 
rejected to discuss the issue of exploration of oil with the Southern Sudan was that 
the discovery of oil might lead to the disintegration of Sudan. And specifically it 
would encourage the Southern politicians to claim their own territory and 
independence as they knew their region was endowed with natural resources. The 
second reason was that the importance of the region as a source of economic 
benefits for the Northern people. According to the AAPA, the Southern Sudan had 
the right to get a share of the natural resource of the Sudan. Because of that reason, 
the Khartoum government did not openly discuss about discovery of oil with them. 
Thus the GOS tried to undermine the development of the region by exploiting the 
region’s potential oil resource.153  
Under this sub-topic, I shall discuss how scholars argue about the discovery of oil 
in the early 1970’s as means to dissolve the AAPA and to redefine the political 
structure of the Southern Sudan. As Lesch (1998) discusses, after the discovery of 
the oil, the Northern government proposed a new policy with regard to the North-
South boundary and Nimeiri suggested a new plan by placing the oil producing area 
into a new unity province closest to the North region. Not surprisingly, the 
discovery of oil near Bentiu in the Southern region led the GOS to re-draw the 
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boundary and tighten its control over the oil areas, which in turn sparked massive 
dissatisfaction among the Southern Sudanese population. Moreover, Nimeiri redrew 
the borders between the Southern and Northern Sudan to create “Unity province”, 
which stretched from the oil fields in Southern Kordofan to the Southern region.
154
 
Despite Nimeiri’s promises to improve education, health, road and other services 
and enhance economic development in Bentiu. However, the public demand of the 
Southern Sudan became stronger against the vice president of Alier for accepting 
the decision of the GOS. As vice president stated,  
We believed that the incentives were satisfactory as far as the issue of 
refinery was concerned; we consequently cooled off…. I asked the public to 
calm down and accept the incentives and to respect the President’s decision, 
but we were not convincing. Public opinion in the South remained hostile 
and condemned me for not fighting physically, if need be.
155
 
Furthermore, Nimeiri decided to build a refinery in Kosti on the shores of the White 
Nile in Northern Sudan but actually the demand of the Southern people was the 
construction of a pipeline and refinery through Bentiu to Mombasa on the coast of 
Kenya. If the GOS had constructed the refinery and pipeline inside the Southern 
region it would have improved the economic status of the South Sudan such as 
construction of public schools, health centers, and education and that would 
improve the standard of living of the Southern people. The action of Nimeiri was 
conceived by many scholars as a deliberate plan to dissolve the AAPA and put the 
autonomy status of the Southern region under the control of the North.
156
 
As a result of this, the Southern regional autonomy would not have any control over 
its oil region and the flow of revenue and tax would have gone directly in the 
pockets of the Northern Sudan, while the Southern region would remain 
undeveloped and did not benefit economically from the oil. Therefore, the 
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discovery of oil that brought Nimeiri to redraw the boundary of Southern Sudan by 
putting the main oil rich regions specifically the Bentiu region and put them under 
the new boundary of Sudan in the Upper Nile region.   
The new boundaries of the Southern Sudan were not according to the previous 
agreement of 1972 in which “the provinces of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper 
Nile, based on the boundaries as they stood on 1 January 1956, constituted as self-
governing region within Sudan known as the Southern region.”157 However, as I 
mentioned Nimeiri violated the right of Southern Sudan to use their resources and 
undermined the various agreements and protocols of the AAPA, which eventually 
led to mass resistance against the GOS.  Certainly, many Southerners remained with 
no option but to join the opposition movement (Anya Nya II) and fight for their 
rights. Their initial motto was to create a “New Sudan” in which the right and the 
participation of the Southern people had to be respected in the future “New 
Sudan”.158 
Unlike Lesch’s argument, other scholars like Alier and Khalid (2003) argue that the 
discovery of oil was not an issue during the 1972 peace talks. There was no 
discussion on the possible discovery of oil at the peace agreement but there was a 
provision signed by both parties on the discovery of natural gas and mining and 
these natural resources were exclusively reserved to the central government. Alier 
further argues that more than the discovery of the oil, the construction of the Jonglei 
Canal was the main cause for the collapse of the AAPA. The construction of the 
canal was part of the grand strategy of the Egyptian government to increase the 
flow of water to Lake Nasser. The construction of the canal would begin from the 
swamps of the Sudd in the White Nile in the Southern Sudan and GOS allotted 
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more than $ 43 million for the construction of 360 kilometer long canal (twice the 
length of the Suez Canal) to a French company in 1976.
159
  
According to Abel Alier, the Southern Sudan was very skeptical to the construction 
of the canal for two obvious reasons. One of the first reasons was that the 
agreement of the canal was made between the GOS and Egypt, which excluded the 
Southern leaders to take part in the agreement. This was viewed as a violation of the 
peace protocols of 1972 in which the Southern people had access to use their 
natural resources. The construction of this canal was not only undermining the right 
of the Southern people but also undermined the 1972 peace agreement. Secondly, 
the agreement of the canal between the GOS and Egypt was to increase the 
agricultural output of both countries and increase the flow of water along the White 
Nile while decreasing the volume of the water in the Southern Sudan. By doing so 
the GOS made the Southern people more economically dependent under the 
leadership of the North.
160
  
Furthermore, Alier noted that since the beginning of the project in 1978, the canal 
did not create enough job opportunities for the local population who lived around 
the Sudd region. Alier also commented that the construction of this project would 
make the people of Southern Sudan economically dependent on the Northern Sudan 
and that action was Nimeiri’s plan to obliterate the regional autonomy of Southern 
Sudan. Sooner or later the people of Southern Sudan began to question the 
leadership of the regional administration since it did not work enough for the 
development of Southern Sudan and more and more people lost hope on the 
Southern leaders.
161
 
In addition to Alier’s point of view, John Garang presented an interesting point on 
the “Jonglei Canal” in his doctoral dissertation in 1981 at Iowa State University. He 
argued that “the Jonglei Canal disrupts the traditional regimen of the Nilotic life in 
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the region. He preferred a combination of drainage, irrigation and mechanized 
farming by creating compact village centers.”162 As the government of Khartoum 
kept the construction of the canal secretly, there were massive riots by more than a 
1,000 students and young people in Juba in 1974 against the plan of the 
construction. The demonstrators destroyed buildings and vehicles and the 
demonstration spread quickly to other part of the Southern region.  
In short it can be concluded that although the discovery of oil had a long term 
impact on the collapse of the AAPA, its economic impact clearly showed after the 
collapse of the peace agreement in 1983. The GOS began to sell its oil production 
in the world’s market by the mid of 1980s. It seems the construction of the Jonglei 
Canal was the most influential factor on the life of the Southern people, specifically 
as it hurt the agriculture sector of the region.
163
 
5.5.1. The End of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1983  
The AAPA was never popular with the Northern politician as the GOS began 
formal negotiations with Southern leaders to end the bloody civil war in Sudan. The 
various Northern political parties such as the Umma and DUP meant that the GOS 
granted too many concessions to the South and that would only encourage separatist 
tendencies in the country. Those who favoured an Islamic state including the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Umma parties also saw this agreement and the 
constitution of 1973 as a barrier for the creation of an Islamic state in Sudan.
164
 But 
for a short time Nimeiri achieved an immense personal popularity among the 
Southern as he was the first leader who ever tried to bring sustainable peace 
between North and South.  
As Johnson has pointed out Nimeiri’s initiatives for peace talks with the Southern 
leaders caused him internal pressure from the Muslim parties who rejected the 
autonomy status of the Southern Sudan. Consequently, there were two attempt of 
coup d'état made against him in 1975 and 1976. That became a major challenge for 
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his government and the continuation of AAPA (1972). Hence many politicians had 
argued that the inclusion of Islamic parties in the National Reconciliation Program 
and the re-drawing of the border of Southern Sudan marked the termination of the 
AAPA.
165
  
Furthermore, Johnson argues that the continuous threat from his enemies (the 
Muslim parties), forced his government to bring the Muslim parties into the 
government position. By doing so the GOS was able to maintain the integrity of the 
Sudan by calling the “National Reconciliation”. In supporting Johnson’s point of 
view Tvedt (2000) claims that the “National Reconciliation” was important to the 
Muslim parties. The agreement ratified the following points: termination of the 
National Front, abolition of the Ansar military training camps, re-affirmation of the 
1973 constitution and the AAPA, freedom of religion both for the Ansar and the 
Muslim Brothers.
166
  
However, Nimeiri’s threat was not only the Muslim parties but economic reasons. 
The economy of Sudan was severely hit by the recession in 1976. As a result the 
World Bank, IMF, and Western donors put restriction on the financial sectors of 
Sudan. Therefore, the GOS brought the Muslim parties into a position to recover 
the economy of the country. According to Lesch the Muslim parties wanted a swift 
implementation of Shar’a Law and Sudan would be a part of an Islamic world. 
Therefore, the application of Shar’a became a means to generate foreign currency 
from the rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries.
167
  
In 1977, as a gesture of National Reconciliation, Nimeiri brought Sadiq al-Mahadi 
from exile and Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim brothers, from prison. 
Many Southern leaders such as Abiel Alier thought that the inclusion of the Muslim 
faction in the government position was a potential threat and would erode the 
autonomy status of the Southern Sudan. After Turabi became the prime minister of 
Sudan, Nimeiri changed the Sudan’s Constitution of 1973 in which Sudan was as a 
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secular state with freedom of worship not only for Christians and Jews, but also for 
the followers of traditional religions as well.
168
  
But gradually Nimeiri adopted the law of Shar’a in Sudan after his government was 
challenged by the Islamic factions and he applied the Law of Shar’a in all aspect of 
Sudan’s civil, criminal and social affairs including the Southern Sudan. In 1983 
after the dissolution of the SRG, the Islamic Law (also known as the ‘September 
Law’) came into effect that indicated the final termination of the AAPA after 10 
years of peace.
169
 By all accounts, one of the other important events led to the end 
of the AAPA was the decision of the Khartoum leaders to decentralize the Southern 
administration into three (Equatoria, Bahr-el-Gazal, Upper Nile) that is contrary to 
the 1972 peace agreement.  
For the Northern politicians the decentralization of Southern Sudan became a best 
strategy to disunite the power of Southern people based on ethnic and class 
divisions. Moreover, the General Chief in the Army of Southern Sudan (Lagu) had 
strongly supported the decentralization policy of Southern Sudan. He argued that 
progress could go forward more rapidly if the South were decentralized. Lagu saw 
the re-division of the South increased the influence of his ethnic group (Equatoria) 
over the Dinka majority in the political sphere of South Sudan. The issue of 
disintegration was first raised by the Central Committee of Sudanese Socialist 
Union. Most of the Southerners in the committee rejected the proposal, particularly 
Alier’s administration strongly opposed the division of Southern Sudan. In the 
following year Nimeiri dismissed the Alier government and requested a referendum 
on dividing the South.  
During the National Assembly in 1982 a two-thirds majority of Southern members 
rejected the plan, meaning that Nimeiri’s plan for dividing the South Sudan became 
unsuccessful. Despite the opposition of Southern Sudan, the GOS with the help of 
Joseph Lagu at his side announced the decentralization of Southern Sudan on 5 
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June 1983. The former Sudanese Minister of the State for Foreign Affairs, Francis 
Deng concluded:  
It is now obvious in hindsight that although the Addis Ababa Agreement in 
fact offered the nation the most promising basis for unity to this point, it was 
not initially intended by Nimeiri as a national accord that would endure over 
the long run. It was, in fact, a tactical move by a desperate dictator in search 
of a political base of representative power.
170
   
One thing we need to understand is that the two main beneficiaries of the AAPA, 
president Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu, disunited the Southern Sudan and were 
responsible for its breakdown. Therefore, the abolishing of HEC, the Regional 
Assembly it was not only violating the AAPA and the 1973 constitution of Sudan 
but it prospects the return of a new civil war between the North and South Sudan. 
After the implementation of the September Laws, Mutiny had occurred against the 
GOS as he ordered to redeploy the Southern battalion around Bor to the Northern 
part of Sudan. The Bor battalion refused Nimeiri’s order and their protest had 
spread swiftly to other part of the Southern Sudan such as in Abei and Juba. The 
mutiny in Bor marked the beginning of the second civil war in Sudan which was 
commonly known as the SPLM movement.
171
   
As a conclusion of this part, I believe that the AAPA came to an end was not 
because of one single factor but due to various political, social, economic and 
religious difficulties and internal division within the southern political parties that 
had developed during the early 1970s.  
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Conclusion 
One of the most remarkable examples of modern international conflict management 
was the process which led to the signing of a peace agreement at the Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia in February 1972. The peace settlement was made between the 
representatives of the central government and the leaders of Southern Sudan with 
the help of third party mediators and entered into an agreement ending the bitter and 
costly war. This peace agreement which was initiated by the president of Sudan 
(Nimeiri), opened a new chapter in the history of Sudan. Indeed, the agreement 
established a considerable degree of regional autonomy for the South, made 
progress for the Southern people to have representatives in the National 
Government, and opened up for economic cooperation. The agreement brought a 
decade of peace and security to the people of South. Nevertheless, there were some 
important aspects that made the agreement impossible not be considered as a model 
of conflict-resolution in Sudan.  
One of the reasons for the establishment of AAPA was the involvement of the 
regional powers in the peace process. The initial peace talks for settlement was 
started by the Emperor of Ethiopia and then by the Church leaders. The civil war in 
Sudan was more complicated than any other civil war in Africa. It roots back to the 
complex historical developments during the colonial regime of the Turko-Egytian, 
the Anglo-Egyptian and the post-independence leaders of Sudan that provoked the 
civil war between North and South. Therefore, without external involvement the 
peace agreement would not have been accomplished. The government of Israel, 
Uganda and Ethiopia were the key allies to the Anya Nya movement in Southern 
Sudan.  
The civil war in Sudan, the illegal flow of weapons in the region complicated the 
peace and security of the region. As a result in 1971 in a secret meeting both the 
president of Sudan (Nimeiri) and the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie reached a 
mutual agreement to stop supporting rebels. In return, Ethiopia would play a key 
role in finding stable peace for the first civil war in Sudan. The role of Ethiopia in 
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the peace process could be considered as the best example in the history of Sudan 
but his political initiative could not create an independent state of the Southern 
Sudan. 
In relation to this, the role of the churches, the World Council Churches (WCC) and 
the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) were playing an important role. The 
churches had actively involved in drafting papers for negotiation and conducting 
various meetings with representatives of both the parties concerning the 
humanitarian situation in the region. In fact, the churches were further increasing 
their support to keep the negotiations on track. Without the involvement of 
Ethiopia, church leaders, and other regional bodies perhaps the peace agreement 
would not have be signed between the two parties.  
The AAPA had also brought a new political structure in the Southern Sudan. The 
main provisions of the AAPA guaranteed the autonomous status of Southern Sudan 
that would be enjoyed by the South following the end of hostilities between the two 
parties. This peace treaty has given the Southern people a distinct border with the 
three provinces of Bahr-el-Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile with its capital Juba. 
Furthermore, the peace agreement allowed the establishment of a semi- democratic 
government in the Southern region and the Southerners had their own Executive 
body which was appointed by the president of Sudan, the regional council which 
controlled all aspects of the Southern policy and the Southern judiciary system 
which dealt with the legal system of the region.  
Despite the degree of autonomy of the South, still there were major departments 
such as finance, army, and defense which were effectively administered by the 
Central government and that gave the GOS a superior position to determine major 
issues in the region’s internal affair. In addition to this, the Southern people enjoyed 
the freedom of speech, expression and religion. The official language in Southern 
Sudan changed from Arabic to English, and English became the second official 
language in Sudan after Arabic. For 10 years all these political changes had taken 
place until it was abrogated by Nimeiri in 1983. 
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Apart from its success, it is very important to look at the weaknesses of the AAPA. 
As I have discussed earlier the churches and regional powers, especially the 
emperor of Ethiopia had played a vital role on ratifying the agreement on March, 
1972. Although the third party mediators were playing a crucial role in bringing 
both parties to the negotiation table, they did not develop well established task 
forces to impose the principle of “carrot and stick” policy if either party did not  
comply with the principle of the agreements. Above all, the peace makers of the 
world such as the UN, European Union (EU) and Organization of African Union 
(OAU) were not properly involved in the peace talks. Therefore, from the 
beginning, the agreement was not the final solution to end the first bloody civil war 
in Sudan.  
One of the problematic issues concerning the AAPA was the reintegration of former 
armies of the Southern Sudan into a National Military Force (NMF). The military 
relationships between the SSLM and Northern forces created more confrontation 
than any other matter. Ending the civil war meant maintaining the armed forces of 
both units until mutual trust could be restored. The agreement called for the 
establishment of NMF with 6,000 from the SSLM (ex-Southern Combatants) and 
6,000 from the North. As Kasfir postulates: 
The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region with 
the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a joint military 
compassion taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of 
troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The 
commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be in such an atmosphere 
of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.”172 
In other words, the agreement reflected that at some point it would be right to mix 
soldiers from both sides to ensure trust and security in Sudan and on the other hand 
by doing so it eliminated the identity of the SSLM units in the long run. By 1974 
several issues arose in the minds of the Southerners. The first issue was the military 
                                                 
172 Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics since the Addis Ababa Agreement," 149. 
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superiority of the ‘old’ units (the Northern Army) over ‘absorbed’ units (SSLM). 
After the singing of the AAPA the GOS was obliged to reduce its military presence 
in Southern Sudan to 6,000 but the number of the troops stationed in the South after 
1972 were more than 18,000. Therefore, this indicated that a large number of 
Northern troops were stationed in the South that broke the principle of agreement.  
The other issue concerning this agreement is that some Southerners also insisted 
that the military camps of old units had been placed to give Northern soldiers a 
strategic advantage in gaining control of the towns in the events of a military 
confrontation. Moreover, the methods of recruitment, military logistics, and the 
quality of weapons of the Southerners were less effective compared with 
Northerners. The soldiers from the North received modern armored personnel 
carriers, tanks and rifles while the Southern did not have it.    
Consequently, the process of integration did not produce effective results. In major 
towns and cities such Yei, Juba and Akobo a number of soldiers from these regions 
were protesting against the integration policy. From its inception, the AAPA did not 
identify clearly what would be the impact of bringing both armies together to form 
the NMF. Historically, politically, and socially the two people had experienced 
dissimilar class divisions right from the beginning of the pre-colonial period up to 
the post colonial period. Therefore, there were suspicion and mistrust among the 
Southern soldier in the process of reintegration.  
Concerning the economic progress, the agreement provided the Southern people an 
opportunity to increase the financial sector of the region, to develop public 
constructions and modern agriculture investment in the area. However, the GOS 
had given only 23.2% of the national budget from 1972-1978 to the South. Due to 
an equal distribution of the nation’s resource, most of the Southern people remained 
under poverty. Major development programs were cut off as the country’s economy 
collapsed internally and that brought anti-government protests spread all over the 
country.  
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As a part of this scenario, the agreement also endorsed an economic recovery for 
the demobilization of the ex-Southern combatants from the army. As I have 
discussed in the previous chapters, the commission of demobilization was intended 
to provide enough jobs, schools and training centers for the demobilized soldiers, 
Nevertheless most of the soldiers did not get what they had been promised. Most of 
the soldiers did not get paid regular salary even some of them were expelled from 
their offices as the economic situation worsened in the country in 1977. Later on 
most of the demobilized ex-Southern combatants became jobless and were not paid 
for a period of time. This meant that most of the ex-soldiers went back to the front 
and fought against the GOS. 
Finally, during the peace agreement the Southern people did not show a unified 
national interest for the unity of the region. Class divisions, sectarian and tribal 
sentiments were major problems of the region. The power struggle among the 
dominant political leaders such as Alier and Lagu created a major setback for the 
peace agreement. The ideological, historical and political differences between the 
leadership of Alier and Lagu opened up a power vacuum in the administration of 
the Southern Sudan. That political division gave direct access for the GOS to 
intervene in the political affairs of the South by playing a double standard game. 
In the final analysis, the AAPA had given relative peace, security and stability to 
the people of Sudan. Shortly, Nimeiri brought Sadiq al-Mahdi the leader of Umma 
party as the Prime Minister, and Hassan al-Turabi became Ministry of Justices in 
1980. In September 1983, Nimeiri announced the imposition of Shar’a Law in 
Sudan. The new provision of Shar’a was applied to all Sudanese, Northern, 
Southern, and Christians. That marked the end of the AAPA and the beginning of a 
new civil war which we call it the second civil war of Sudan (SPLM).                
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Political map of Sudan (I)                     
    (http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/map-political/South-Sudan-political-
map.htm )        
79 
 
Political map of Sudan (II)   
     
(http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/map-political/South-Sudan-political-
map.htm) 
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